

The Fifteenth and Sixteenth

(15)

OF THE

CONTROVERSIAL

LETTERS,

OR

Grand Controversie,

Concerning

The pretended Temporal Authority of
POPES over the whole Earth,

And the

True Sovereign of **KINGS** within
their own respective Kingdoms.

Between two English Gentlemen,

The one of the Church of England.

The other of the Church of Rome.

L O N D O N,

Printed for *Henry Brome* at the Gun, and *Benjamin Tooke*
at the Ship in St. Paul's Church-yard. 1679.

144 (15)

Grand Conveyance

The premises hereunto conveyed
to the said John & Mary

The said John & Mary
the owners of the same

to be and to remain

to the said John & Mary
their heirs and assigns forever

FRIEND,

I Have got a new Flea in my Ear, which you must needs pull out. It is like enough my importunity may not be over-welcom, and you may think perhaps I grate on our Friendship, by pressing you against your humour : But truly, I have no mind to remain in the dark till you be in the humour of Writing. I may tarry long enough, for ought I see, if I stay till that day comes. In short, I think my curiosity more reasonable than your humour ; and for our Friendship I have given enough to it, and more than I can justify to my reason, by forbearing you thus long ; not but that your last complaints appeared to me as Just as Pathetical, and I truly wish I were able to contribute more to your ease than a fruitless compassion. But what ? because the World goes not as we would have it, must we therefore whine away our lives, and mourn our selves out of what we may have, because we cannot have all we would ? Alas ! we are but Passengers in the Ship of the World. Whatever our desires, whatever our concerns are, we must be carried as Winds and Tides drive the great Vessel. Consider what a fine kind of madness 't would be, to grow sullen, and neglect our selves, and fall out with our fellow Passengers, because the Winds do not blow as we would have them. You and I have nothing to do with the Helm, and 'tis well we have not, for with our unskilfulness we should quickly have more to complain of than cross Winds. But we know there is a Pilot whom the Seas and Winds obey, and who having the appointing of his Substitutes, we are sure has chosen the fittest. However we know he watches over them himself, and will certainly bring the Vessel safe into Harbour at last. The care of our passage is a business which belongs to him, and with him we may securely trust it. This being so, I cannot see it is other than plain folly to repine our selves at matters which belong not to us, and are besides in safe hands, into a neglect of those which do. Our only business is to know as much as we can of our duty, and do as much as we know ; and this you shall permit me to pursue. If you

refuse to go along with me, I must tell you plainly I shall have more reason to complain of your resty humour, than you of any thing besides.

Lighting by chance on *Aitzema's Resolutions in the United Provinces*, I observed an Address, from the Deputys of the Synods to the States General, which shockt me strangely. The first Article of the means proposed by them for hindring the Popes Hierarchy, &c. runs thus, *That all of the Popish Clergy, Jesuits, Priests, Fryars, &c. be kept out of the Land, they being no Subjects of any secular Princes or Magistrates, but only of the Courts of Rome, according to their own Tenets, &c.* Now I wonder not to see the Deputys of Synods willing to be rid of their Clergys company. Every body knows there is no great kindness betwixt them: but that they should deny them to be subjects of Secular Princes, and bring even themselves for Vouchers, is a thing I know not what to make of.

Pray Friend, do these men say true? If they do, the Pope is much a greater man than I took him for. 'Tis not the Patrimony of St. Peter, the Liberality of Pepin, or Marbildeir which confines his Sovereignty: for 'tis plainly extended as far as his communion, and that not only upon the score of that Supremacy, which shares stakes with Princes, and leaving Temporals to them contents it self with Spirituals; but with a Superiority which admits no Co-partnership, and sweeps all for himself. Methinks it is a pretty trick this of the Pope to get his Subjects maintained at other folks charges, and set up a Principality of his own in the Dominions of other Princes. But yet I wonder how he could contrive it: for should any man but the Pope come to any Prince, and say, I beseech you, Sir, let so many of your Subjects leave acknowledging you, and turn Subject to me; he had need of great power in Rhetorick to hope to prevail. What wise bustles have sometimes been made in the World, and peradventure still continue in some places! Princes think they do great matters when they suffer not the Pope to dispose of Benefices in their Territories to others than their own Subjects; when all the while they have it seems no Subjects to whom they can be disposed, unless they would have them disposed to the Laity, which every body knows cannot be: yet much ado they keep to have those only preferred, who are born in places Subject to them; as if it were

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any matter where they were born, if when they come to Benefices they are no longer Subject to any but the Pope; and all the dispute be, whether he shall promote a Subject of this or that Nation, but still equally his own Subject. By this account a Benefice is a strange thing; for it dissolves the Tye betwixt Prince and Subject. And I should think there is no worse nor more ruinous Simony in the World, than to purchase one at the price of Allegiance.

I tell you truly, *Friend*, all this looks to me with a very odd face, and would almost tempt me to suspect animosity had transported the *Holland* Deputys to say more than perhaps they believed. Yet I thought it incredible, that persons chosen and Commissionated to represent their Churches, should come with a lie in their mouth to an Assembly of the *States General*. Besides, the Assembly sitting long, the Churches made a second Address by new Deputys; and They again insisted on the same Article, and for the same reason. I could not believe this perseverance in a change of persons could be without ground. Nevertheless, as I love to hear both sides, I was desirous to know what your men say to the matter.

I had none but *Bellarmin* at hand, with whom, to tell you the truth, I cared not to meddle; I have dealt with him, you know, formerly, and found not my account, and should have been glad of another Chapman. But I was over-stocked with Curiosity, a fretting Ware, and which will not stay for a good Market. As much as my mind misgave me, in defect of another, I ventur'd on him, and read his 28. and 29 Chapters of his first Book *de Clericis*, where he treats of this matter; and 'tis just as I feared; for I know not how it happened, but I have alwaies mighty ill luck with *Bellarmin*; for any satisfaction I have got, I might e'en as well have thrown Cross or Pile for the matter. To my thinking, he talks a good while on both sides, and so as to reserve the liberty of answering *Subjects*, or *not Subjects*, as happens to be most convenient when the Question is askt. On the one side he tells us that the Clergy, besides their Clerical capacity, are also Citizens and parts of the Politick Common-wealth, and in that respect obliged to keep the Civil Laws, consistent with the holy Canons and duty of a Clerical life; because otherwise much trouble and confusion would happen in the Common-wealth. On the other side,
that

that the obligation, which the Clergy have to observe the Civil Laws, is directive only, not co-active, and that only in defect of an Ecclesiastical Law. For should an Ecclesiastical Law dispose otherwise even of the temporal things ordered by the Civil Law, the Clergy are to stick to the Ecclesiastical, and not observe the Civil so much as directive. Again, that they cannot be judged by the Civil Magistrate, if they do not keep the Civil Law; and that their Goods, whether Ecclesiastical or Secular are not liable to the Tributes of Secular Princes.

To my apprehension now, the Clergy, according to one half of this Doctrine, are very good Subjects; according to the other, none at all. If they be parts of the Common-wealth, they must of necessity be Subjects, unless they be Princes; For a Common-wealth holds none but Prince and Subjects. If they be oblig'd to the observation of the Civil Laws, they are Subjects again, that obligation being the very thing we call subjection. But if their Actions, when they break the Laws, are not liable to the cognizance of the Civil Magistrate, nor their Goods in their share in the common burthens; if they obey the Laws only out of good nature, and to do as others do, and no longer than till they have order to the contrary, I should think they are not Subjects, unless in respect of him whose orders they are to obey. For there can be no Subjects without a Prince, nor Prince without Power, nor Power without something on which it may be exercised. If the Secular Prince can exercise no power over their persons, nor what they have, nor what they do; there remains nothing, that I see, on which his Power can work; and consequently neither Power, nor Prince, nor Subject. Wherefore to my apprehension all this is Handy Dandy: the Clergy are Subjects, or not Subjects, according to the hand you chuse, or *Bellarmin* will open.

I could be content to understand by the way, if I might hope to understand any thing of *Bellarmin*, what meaning there is in his distinction betwixt Directive and Co-active obligation. What Directive means, and what Co-active, I think, I understand. He who shews me a way I know not, is said to Direct; and who draws me along in it, whether I will or no, to Force me. So Laws are properly called Directive, because they inform us what we are to do; and Co-active, because they constrain us by fear of punishment to follow their direction. Accord-

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cording to this, it may be said with sence, whether with Truth or no is another Question, That the Clergy are directed by the Laws to what is fit for them to do, but not obliged to do it. But it passes my capacity how Obligation should be divided into Directive and Co-active, or Co-active, and not Co-active, when all obligation to my thinking is Co-active. For since he who is obliged to any thing, is not at liberty to do, or leave it undone, but constrained to do it in force of the obligation upon him, methinks obligation imports Co-action in its Notion; and that to say, there can be an obligation which is not Co-active, is to say there can be an obligation which is not an obligation. I fancy *Bellarmin* took his hint from Princes, who being free from the Co-action of their Laws, yet observe their Direction because they will, and see it fit. But then for this very reason, because they are not subject to their co-action, we say Princes are absolutely not obliged by their Laws; and if *Bellarmin* had a mind to make the case equal betwixt them and the Clergy, he should put no obligation in the Clergy, as the Language of the World puts none in Princes. Yet to say the truth, I conceive by his not co-active obligation, he intended not to exempt the Clergy from constraint and punishment, so the Secular Magistrate have nothing to do with it; which whether he have or no, I enquire not now. Whosoever has to do with it, if the thing be to be done, if the Clergy be punishable in the Ecclesiastical Court only if you will, co-action still is inseparable from obligation, and not co-active obligation pure riddle.

Again, since the reason he gives of his Directive obligation of the Clergy, is to avoid confusion in the Commonwealth, I would gladly know how much less confusion there would be, if they broke the Laws, not by a relincks of their own, but by command from another. Both ways the Laws would be broken, and so the thing be done, it matters not much which way. If there be any difference, I should think disobedience from private Capricios less inconvenient than from publick commands. Capricios are seldom either universal or lasting. Those who remain'd sober, would help to reclaim the rest, and a hundred remedies might be applied, with hopes of success. But where the disobedience is universal and countenanced by Authority, the disease is little better than desperate.

One had as good say, the Clergy are bound to keep the Laws, as long as they can do but a little harm by breaking them, and to break them when they can do a great deal. Let us put the case in his own Examples. If the Secular Power impose such a rate on vendible things, or forbid carrying of Arms in the night, or transportation of Corn out of the Country, or the like, the Clergy are to obey as well as the rest, till an Ecclesiastical Law dispose otherwise; very well. Let us suppose then that the Secular Power, by the Authority which it has in these things, has rated a pot of Ale at a penny; should the Clergy out of Thrift or stubbornness pay but a half-penny, others would either grumble they should have their drink cheaper, or perhaps sell them none. To avoid this inconvenience, they are *directively* obliged to pay a whole penny, provided the Ecclesiastical Law interpose not; but let that come, and set another rate, a half penny for Example, then they are *co-actively* obliged to pay no more. Now I would fain know of *Bellarmin*, how much less inconvenience there is, now the Clergy must pay but a half penny out of conscience, than before when they would pay no more out of stubbornness. Will other people grumble less at the inequality, or will they get any more drink? For my part I suspect the Ale-house-keepers will turn stubborn in their turns, and not afford them for their half penny what they can have a penny for of the Lay-good-fellows, who both *directively* and *co-actively* pay still according to the Secular rate. I doubt they will be forc'd to strain a point of Conscience, and for all the Ecclesiastical Law, and their obligation to stick to it, be even *co-actively* obliged to pay as others do, or remain thirsty. Go on if you please to the rest with the imagination, for I will stay no longer here, and when you have considered the difference betwixt breaking the Prohibitions of weapons, or Transporting Corn, &c. by private Capricios, and publick and obligatory commands; tell me whether *Bellarmin* were not in a pleasant humour, and had great care of the Commonwealth, when he made a little inconvenience reason enough to oblige the Clergy to keep the Civil Laws, and permits and makes it their duty to break them with twenty times a greater. I say nothing of the greatest inconvenience of all, the acknowledging a Foreign Authority, which can oblige so great a number of persons living within the bounds, and taken for members

members of the Common-wealth, as belong to the Clergy, to break all Laws even in Temporal things, because at present I mind only how pat the reason is which he gives for his *Directive* obligation of the Clergy: Otherwise that *Doctrine* brings not only confusion and trouble, but ruin to the Common-wealth, and is absolutely intolerable. But this is not a place for it.

To return into our Road, *Bellarmin* tells us at last, that the Clergy and Laity have, even in Temporals, different Laws, a different Prince, and different Tribunals, and that the Common-wealth which holds them, is in truth and formally two Common-wealths, though because they all live in the same place, and under protection of the same Prince, it be materially one. Also that, in respect of the Clergy, Princes are not superiour Powers, and therefore the Clergy are not bound to obey them neither by Divine, nor so much as Human right, unless *Directively* in certain cases, as was said before. This is full and home; for *Bellarmin* can speak plain enough when he has a mind to it. But the Question, and my Curiosity are now at an end. For I do not mean to be laught at by persisting to enquire, whether the Clergy be subject to him who is not their Prince, nor in respect of them a superiour power. It is something strange though. By this account the Clergy are no more subjects to the Prince, in whose Dominions they live, than Aliens, who live in his Country under his protection. They are as much a new and strange kind of Aliens, bred and born, and unmoveably settled in a Common-wealth; and yet Aliens still. However it be, I have no more to say to the *Holland* Deputies. *Bellarmin* has acquitted them. It remains that he acquit himself: for as great a man as he is, so unexpected and so important a Doctrine will hardly pass upon his bare word.

He proves it both from Human and Divine Right. And I commend him for leaving nothing out; but think nevertheless I may deduct the one half, and confine my inquiry to Divine Right. For Human Right being either by Civil or Ecclesiastical Laws, what the Clergy have by Civil Laws, is so far from prejudicing their subjection, that it rather confirms it. For Receiving is an acknowledgment of the power from which they receive. Besides Princes, whether they can or no, yet use

not to grant any thing derogatory from their own Sovereignty; or if they do, recall it on better consideration. What in particular it is, which the Clergy have this way, we must enquire of those who know the Laws; whatever it be, much good may it do them. Were all men of my mind, peradventure it should be more than it is: for I am of opinion, they cannot be respected too much; and whatever serves; whether to preserve or increase that respect, is the Laity's good as much as theirs, and perhaps more.

As for Ecclesiastical Laws, I conceive they need no place of their own at present, but may come in either with Civil or Divine. For if the stress be put only there, so that before the Ecclesiastical Laws were made, the Clergy were Subjects, and had been so still if those Laws had not exempted them from subjection, Princes I suppose will expect their consent should be askt; Ecclesiastical Laws of this nature not binding without the concurrence of the Civil Power. And then the Question will be, to what and how far the Civil power is engaged, which plainly belongs to Civil Right? But if the Ecclesiastical Law be supposed, not originally to give, but declare and press that exemption, as due to the Clergy by an antecedent Law of God or nature, the exemption is then refunded into that antecedent Law, and there, as I conceive, it only pinches. Wherefore leaving Bellarmine's proofs from Civil and Ecclesiastical Laws, to those who are skil'd and concern'd in them, I am only curious to know what kind of proofs he will bring from the Divine Law, which if it do command such things as he affirms of the Clergy, truly, I have hitherto been very ill instructed in it. He divides them into the two branches of Positive and Natural Divine Law; either of which would have serv'd his turn; but he will needs undertake for both.

Beginning with the Positive, he desires us first to observe, That by the Positive Law of God, he means not any command of God properly so called, which expressly appears in Holy Writ, but what may by some similitude be deduced from the Examples or Testimonys of the Old or New Testament. Now this seems to me a very inauspicious beginning, and as much as to say, that by the Positive Law of God, he means the not-Positive Law of God. For pray what does Positive signify? It is used in contradistinction to Natural, and Natural signifies the Law, or Rule

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Rule of Actions, imprinted in us by Reason; which inasmuch as it is our nature, gives it the Title of *Natural*; inasmuch as that nature proceeds from God, the Title of *Divine*. But because it happens from the shortness, or corruption of nature, that what appears reasonable to one, appears unreasonable to another; this Rule becomes a kind of *Lesbian Rule*, bent by our passions several waies. To remedy which mischief, and not leave us altogether to the uncertain conduct of our erring Judgements, God in his mercy has expressly declared his pleasure, about what we are to do, or avoid, in the matters so declared. This expresse declaration is called his *Positive Law*, which supplies the defects of nature, and freeing us from groping blindly in the dark, and wrangling fruitlessly and endlessly about what is or is not our duty, sets it in a clear light before us, and leaves us nothing to do but perform it.

This being so, I would fain learn of *Bellarmin* what pretence there can be for the Positive Law of God, where there is no expresse command of his, and we are left to our uncertain Deductions? What difference betwixt this, and the case of pure nature, and what shall hinder us from wrangling as long and to as little purpose, as if there were no such thing as his *Positive Law* in the World? Nay though we could come to an end, since this end is to be made at last by the force of prevailing Reason, which can satisfie us of the Truth of the deductions it makes, why is not that end to be refunded rather into Reason, than the Law of God? We may possibly have some assistance from it towards the direction of our Reason. But Positive Law is one thing; the operations even of assisted Reason another. And I cannot imagine how the operations of Reason should by one that loves to speak properly, as *Bellarmin* does, be called the Law of God. Though it be the Law of God on which Reason works, yet it's Reason still that works; and unless we have good security that our Reason is particularly directed in these operations, I know not why it may not fail us as well here as elsewhere. A body would think the sad distractions which perplex the World in matters that concern the Law of God, are too good an Argument, that our Reason fails us no where more.

But that the World is a *confident World*, and the Cry always great whatever the Wooll be, I should wonder people

should not fear to make so bold at every turn with God and his Law. For whoever is mistaken in his reasoning, plainly pins his own mistakes upon unerring Truth; and who is not, has at most but hit upon a true conclusion in Divinity, which if he will call the Positive Law of God, he must have a language by himself.

Nevertheless, if *Bellarmin* once in his life be infallible in his Logick, and have rightly deduc'd his conclusion from his Premises, whether it may be called the Positive Law of God or no, I acknowledge it is to be embrac'd, as all Truth is whatever name it have, and however we come by it. But I must needs avow, his credit is not great enough with me to engage my laziness into the trouble of examining his Arguments. I see he cites Classical Authors; men of great names even among your selves, who know as little of the positive Law, he talks of, as my self, and who positively deny there is any such thing in the case.

By the way, one may perceive it was not Lightness, but Necessity which drew *Bellarmin* to intitle his reasonings to the Law of God. He had a mind to establish the exemptions of the Clergy on that Basis, which he was sure was firm and unmoveable. But because there was no such Law to be found, to put his own deductions in its stead, was a forc'd put. And if a second reason may be thought of, why he should leave undone what was impossible to be done, I suppose he might have some consideration of the Gentlemen his Adversarys. For it would have been a troublesome business to have made out, how there should be a positive Law of God, of which Masters in *Israel*, as well as himself, were ignorant, had he understood by it what others do.

But to let this pass, till he and his Friends are agreed, I have no temptation to thrust my self into their quarrels. I do not think but they have something still to say for themselves, for all he has urged against them. Till he have stop't their mouths, and left them without reply, I think I may take the liberty to shink them as likely to be in the right as he, and unblameably dissent from him, as well as those of his own party.

Again, People in this Age use not to perform altogether so much as they Promise: and *Bellarmin* does not promise more than some similitude between the cases he finds in the Scripture, and

and that of the Clergy now adaies. Though he should perform to the uttermost, I suspect the result would be little more than to make hard shift to bring an Argument against himself. He mentions in all four places of Scripture, whereof three, according to his own reckoning, amount but to this: The *Levites* were exempted by the Positive Law, and therefore Priests, who are as good men as they, ought to be so too. I fear *Bellarmin* will hardly be contented, though a man should allow him all the exemptions which can be proved due to the *Levites* by the old Law. But I will not meddle with that matter. It is plain that God did expressly give the *Levites* the exemptions mentioned in the old Law; it is confessed by *Bellarmin*, that there is no express mention in the new Law of those exemptions to the Clergy for which he contends. I see not why this does not evidently conclude, that God was not of *Bellarmin*'s mind, and intended not that the Clergy should owe their exemptions to his Law. For otherwise, why did he not exempt them expressly as he did the *Levites*? Unless we could swallow the Blasphemy of imagining God was less careful of *Priests* than *Levites*: or when he came to deliver us a new Law, forgot to insert all he intended, and left it to be supplied by our whimsys. These places, I think, prove the just contrary of what *Bellarmin* would have, and that which follows is, that as the exemptions of the *Levites* were by the positive Law of God, because they are expressly mentioned in it, so the Clergys exemptions are not by the positive Law of God, because there is no mention of them in it.

However it be, when I reflect that the Topick which, for want of a better, *Bellarmin* is fain to chuse, is à *Simili*, and that *Like*, or *Unlike* is to be found or made every where: when I reflect, that even this top dwindles into a *quandam similitudinem*, a thing which may be found in the most contrary things that are, for there is some kind of likeness even betwixt Fire and Water, I cannot see but that to meddle with it, is to begin an Inquiry which never will have end. For I believe Doomsday will sooner come, than he shall have made his cases so like, that no difference can be found between them; and till he do, the Topick concludes not.

I turn me therefore to observe what work he will make with his Divine natural Law, which he first distinguishes into three degrees.

degrees. In the first, he places those commands of nature, which are so clearly imprinted in mens hearts, that they need no Discipline or Art, but by the bare light of Reason, even without the help of new discourse, are by all esteemed Just. As that *Good* is to be desired, *Evil* avoided, &c. The second degree, is of those which follow from those first principles as immediate conclusions, naturally flowing by an easie, evident and necessary consequence; and which, as the former, need not Discipline or Art, but only simple discourse, such as all men may have. Of this kind he reckons the commands of the Decalogue. Now the Exemptions of the Clergy belong not to either of these two, but to a third Degree of natural commands, which he says are indeed deduced from the Law of nature, but by a consequence neither absolutely necessary, nor altogether evident, and which therefore stand in need of Humane Constitution.

I should be beholding to him who would tell me what this means. For I can make nothing of it, and am mightily afraid this unnecessary, and unevident consequence of his, has a third quality, and will prove unintelligible too. *Deducing*, I think, signifies discovering the connexion of two Terms between themselves, because they are both connected with one third. If that connexion be not seen, I should think 'tis all one as if it were not: and if it be seen, then to him who sees it, 'tis evident. I should think again, that where there is no necessary consequence, or connexion of Terms in the conclusion, there is no connexion of them with a Third in the Premises. For if there be, their connexion is as necessary, as the connexion of that Third with it self, or its being what it is; so that the consequence plainly is either necessary, or none. If this be so, a consequence neither evident nor necessary, is evidently and necessarily no consequence, and so far from communicating the force of the Law of nature to the conclusion, that it communicates none at all.

Wherefore take away the learned Terms, and that which *Bellarmin* says, is in plain *English* this, *I would have you believe that the Law of Nature commands the exemptions of the Clergy, which it may do for ought I know, though I neither see it does, nor any necessity why it should. But yet I would have you believe it, because I find it would be very convenient it should be so.*

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Though this sound not altogether so amusingly as in his language, yet I fancy it might be as efficacious. For plain dealing is a taking thing, and might perhaps work with many; but when you set upon them with dint of Argument, people stand upon their guard, and to attempt them with unnecessary and unseen consequences, is a desperate business, when the most evident necessary in the World often fails of success.

The truth is, *Bellarmin* himself does not trust his Deductions at this time; For he says, they stand in need of *Humane Constitution*. And I pray for what is this *Humane Constitution* needful? Is it to make the not evident, and not necessary conclusion, evident and necessary, and make that follow from natural Principles, which does not follow from natural Principles? This indeed is what needs: but 'tis more than *Humane Constitution* can do. For Conclusions follow from the seen Identity of Premises, and all the Authority of all mankind put together, can never make that be seen, which is not to be seen, or an Identity where there is a difference. Or does he mean that *Humane Constitution* is needful to make the Conclusion, which cannot prevail by its own strength, be accepted in virtue of the constitutive Authority? This indeed *Humane constitution* can do; for it matters not whether the conclusion be well or ill deduced, if those who can command, will have it obey'd. But then what is established this way stands wholly upon *Humane*, and not at all on *Natural Right*, farther than as *Nature* or *Reason* is the ground of all Laws. For take away the *Humane constitution*, nature is so far from obliging any body to a consequence confessedly unconcluding, that on the contrary it obliges him not to accept it, he being not true to his Reason, which is his nature, who does. This being plain, to what purpose does *Bellarmin* keep such ado with the Law of nature, when he meant to resolve all into the pure Law of man at last?

I should guess, by the hint he gives presently after, that he had a mind to make his Exemptions unalterable; for he infers, that what depends on the Law of Nations, which he makes equivalent to his third branch, cannot be abrogated or changed by Princes, because it is in some sort natural. This would have founded something like, if he had not told us what he meant. But the mischief is, we know before-hand, that his *in some sort natural*, means deduc'd from Nature neither evidently nor necessarily,

cessarily, and that signifying not deduc'd, the sort which he calls natural, signifies a sort of standing upon nature, so as not to stand upon nature, but upon the needful humane Authority, that is a not natural sort. And then, because his Exemptions can be no otherwise unchangeable than as they are natural, there is neither evidence nor necessity of their unchangeableness, and so the most that can be said of them, is that they are unchangeable in some sort likewise, namely in such sort as they are natural, that is, in a not unchangeable, or changeable sort.

Wherefore when we come to cast up accounts with *Bellarmin*, and see what his Divine Right amounts to, we find that what he calls Divine Positive Law, is, even by his confession, no Law of God, but deductions from the worst and most hopeless of Topicks. Which who will go about to examine, had need be a man of great leisure, and who can promise himself a great age; otherwise his attempt will be desperate: and what he calls Divine Natural Law, is likewise no Law of Nature, but Deductions like the former, as weak and as endless, and which to save us the fruitless trouble of examining, he fairly gives us warning are unconcluding, And this is Divine Right in *Bellarmin's* language.

Notwithstanding, because Truth has influence on the actions of men, not as it is in it self, but as it appears to them, it imports not so much what is, as what is apprehended; wherefore let *Bellarmin's* proofs be never so bad, if you apprehend them good, 'tis all one as if they were perfect Demonstrations. Tell me then what you think of the matter; what you believe, and what you do in this point; whether *Bellarmin* and the Church be of the same mind, and all the immunities attributed by him to the Clergy, pass among you for unquestionably Divine and Unalterable Right. And remember our Question is not whether they have exemptions or no. Every body sees they are, and ought be free from divers burthens of the Common-wealth, since otherwise they could not live a Clerical life, as 'tis necessary, even for the good of the Laity they should. But the question is, what those Exemptions are, and how They come by them. For my part I should think that if any Exemption claimed or enjoy'd by them, be discovered harmful to the Common-wealth, such an exemption is neither necessary to a Clerical life, nor commanded by God. In particular

I see no necessity of their exemption from Secular Tribunals, and conceive they might be very good Clergy men without it. What prejudice can it be to the Dignity and perfection of their state, to be aw'd from doing ill by fear of punishment? To do ill is the greatest prejudice to both; how being restrained from prejudicing their state, should be a prejudice to their state, is beyond my understanding. They are but men, as much the best men as They ought to be, and to have their frailty expos'd to one Temptation more than the rest of mankind, and that the strongest of Temptations, Impunity, is, in my opinion, far from a Benefit. I think he is not their Friend who exempts them from fear of punishment, unless he exempt them too from the possibility of deserving it.

Again, would They do any thing misbecoming their condition, if They paid their shares in Publick Taxes? They who are to wean the hearts of the Laity from affection to Riches, and the rest of perishable goods, should rather set them an example of their Doctrine: and are like to be heard but ill, when they Preach on that subject, if they be known to love Riches themselves, and refuse, in the necessities of the Commonwealth, to part with what the wisdom of it judges they may spare. Either shew me that a Clergy man cannot live as a Clergy man should, without such exemptions as these, or I shall never believe they are commanded by the Law of God or Nature.

Then the Tenure, by which they hold what they have, is to be consider'd. Not but what they have purely from the Piety and Liberality of men is truly theirs, and to look upon it with regret, is Envy, and to take it causlessly away, Injustice. Notwithstanding though there were no more in the case, it is a point of Gratitude to acknowledge our Benefactors. But if we reflect, that Divine Right is an unmoveable Basis, on which whatever stands can never be stirred; Humane Right is subject to the contingency of Humane things; it will appear of considerable importance, on which of the two the exemptions of the Clergy be settled; for it may happen, that what is convenient in one time and place, may be inconvenient elsewhere, and in another season. Now 'tis in Human Authority to provide a remedy for whatever inconvenience change of circumstances shall produce in Exemptions derived from Human Au-

thority. But if all be thought to flow from a Divine Spring, let the waters be never so troubled, or corrupt, never so rapid, or overflow with never so much prejudice, the mischief is without remedy. By the way, since no ill can proceed from the Fountain of Good, if any Exemption bring mischief along with it, that Exemption confutes it self, and needs no second Argument to evidence it has no warrant from God or Nature. *Bellarmin* now says, They are of Divine Right all: Reason says some, at least, are harmful to Princes, harmful to the Commonwealth, harmful to the Clergy themselves: what says the Church? Is she for *Bellarmin*, or Reason? You and I have kept a great coyl to little purpose, if she stand fast to *Bellarmin*, and all our past labour is e'en much ado about nothing.

For what avails it to shut up the great gate of Direct, and back door of Indirect Power, if there be still a way underground to get into the house? All hitherto said in behalf of Princes is, that the Pope cannot take away their Kingdoms for any cause. What is this better than a Cheat, if he can, even without any cause, take away their subjects? For what is a Kingdom good for, and indeed what is it but the subjects? Consider what a Prince he were, into whose Dominions strangers might enter in what numbers they pleased without his leave, and plant, and settle themselves, and live without subjection to him; And tell me what difference there is, whether those men be strangers or natives. This is at least a partial Deposition, a fair step to a total, and in some respect worse. For that may be avoided by a Prince, who will alwaies do what the Pope pleases, and give him no hold, since it cannot be put in practice without Demerit. But from this no, even, Merit can preserve any Prince. The Pope not only may, but of necessity must depose him from all Sovereignty over as many as belong to the Clergy. And how far may that carry? Exemptions, if I mistake not, are extended to the Families of Clergy-men too, and so as many servants as they take, so many subjects the Prince loses. What if they should stretch it a little farther to honorary servants too, and bring exemptions into fashion as well as Protections? I should wonder if all this, and twenty times as much, might not be deduc'd from the Law of Nature too, in *Bellarmin's* method, inevidently and unnecessarily. What if they should yield sometimes to the frailty of nature,
and

and out of Avarice or Revenge, take their Neighbours Goods or life? If they cannot be Indited, but are exempt from that Fear, which is the great security men in community have of their Lives and Fortunes, I suspect 'twill not be good living too near a Clergy-man.

But to leave such unlikely Speculations, the Clergy, especially in their Countries, where Religious abound, are considerable even in number; and every where in quality, for the Influence they have over the people, more I believe than any other kind of those into which the people are divided. Consider what fine doings there would be, if the most considerable part of a Nation owe no subjection to the Prince, no contribution to the common necessities, no obedience to the Laws, in short, be a part of the Nation, and no part of the Commonwealth. What Title have they to the benefits of it, who bear no share in the burthens? What to the protection of Laws, who break them at pleasure? What pretence to security in the enjoyment of their Goods, from which they, who secure them, can promise themselves no assistance upon occasion? Other mens estates are so theirs, that they are more the Commonwealths, which can at any time take as much of them, as the publick necessities require. With what comes to the Clergy, she has no more to do, more than to keep it safe to them, that they may keep it safe from her, and be a Guard for them against herself. Consider what this imports. I mistake, if I have not heard of times and places, in which a fourth part of the value of the whole has been in the Clergys hands. Riches being the strength of a Nation, that Nation was plainly a fourth part weaker, than it would have been otherwise. But whatever be the proportion, what the Clergy gets the Commonwealth loses, and I suspect there are few which can with safety bate any part of their strength. I will say no more, believing that you see enough what I would be at. Either dam up the Spring, if you judge, as I do, the waters unwholsome, or shew they are wholsome. Chuse which you please, only let me not long bear the burthen of the impatient curiosity which is now upon

Yours, &c.

I must needs add a word of what every body talks of. What work has their Religion made among us? Pray tell me what you think of the matter: for I will refer it to your self, and make you Judge, whether it be for a rational man, to entertain a good thought of a Religion which has set a whole Nation in a flame. Excuse my Freedom, or if you will, bluntness. Reproaches, I know, ill become the mouth of a Friend at any time, and have something of inhuman in affliction. They are not meant to You, but to that restless Spirit which haunts your Religion, a Spirit which no moderation and good usage of others, no hazard and inconvenience of your own, can charm into quiet; a Frenzy which keeps you always talking and waking even when you are ready to die for want of silence and sleep. For yourself, to do you right, I think you well in your wits, and an honest man, the only honest man of your party.

FRIEND,

FRIEND,

YOU have the pleasant'st Fancys! To hear you talk, a man would think Princes could not Rule, nor People live in quiet, and the World in danger of being turn'd Topſy Turvy, and all for a Page or two in *Bellarmin*. The Book has been out a pretty while, and twenty more perhaps have ſince ſaid as much, perhaps more than he, and yet we make a ſhift, thanks be to God, to live ſtill, and the World ſtaggers on the uſual reeling pace. What is it alarms you thus? Your Clergy pretend to none of thoſe things which diſquiet you; and let ours pretend what they will, you know well enough how to deal with them. While you order them as you think fit, 'tis no great matter how they think of themſelves. To ſee the different Judgments of men. This Queſtion, which to you appears ſo important, and ſo neceſſary, to me ſeems not ſo much as ſeaſonable. There is no time wherein people ſhould not be wary what they ſay of thoſe, whoſe office it is to keep alive the Sacred fire rain'd down from Heaven on the day of *Pentecoſt*, and preſs upon us the concerns of the next life, without which all the advantages of this are not only uſeleſs, but harmful. But in an Age not at all favourable, and hardly juſt to them, when all the weight we can throw into their ſcale will ſcarce keep the ballance even, methinks 'tis very improper to take any out. All your mighty concern, and all your importunity, ſhould never move me to do it. But I conſider that Falſhood weighs not; or if it do, 'tis on the contrary ſide. For the advantages ſought from Untruth, turn to diſadvantage at laſt. The Clergy have Prerogatives eſta bliſh'd by the wiſdom and goodneſs of God, which raiſe them, as 'tis fit they ſhould be, above the reſt of mankind. Who ſeeks to increaſe them by ungrounded fancys, is not their Friend, 'Tis as if a man ſhould go about to enlarge his houſes with new buildings on a bad foundation, which will certainly fall themſelves, and beſides endanger to pull down part of the old with them. Who grasps at what is not his, hazards to loſe what is. For ſuch is the

the malice of the World, when we have once found a hole in our Neighbours Coat, within a while he may chance to have never a whole piece. If reason warrant us to except against any one, our perverseness will tempt us to except against every thing: And so we actually see there is Confidence, I was about to say Impudence, enough in the World to make even Preaching, and the Administration of the Sacraments common to the Laity. I know not whether this be not the true, at least original, Reason of the complaints of this Age. However it be, I am perswaded that to discover what is unsound in the Prerogatives, whether pretended by, or obtruded upon, the Clergy, is to deserve well at their hands, and the best, and perhaps only way, to make what is sound more stable and lasting. This perswasion, more than your earnestness, prevails with me to do as you would have me, and tell you what I think of the business with all the sincerity and plainness I can.

In the first place, I think, whatever be of the conclusion, *Bellarmin's* Arguments are not good, and prove not Divine Right, either Positive or Natural; in which, we being all agreed of Human Right, the only difficulty lies. It would save me some pains, if I shifted them off as you do, with quarrelling at the Topicks. But I consider, that though an Argument *à Simili* be none of the surest, and often fail, yet it may hit, and the Topick is allow'd among the rest in Logick. Besides, to reject an Argument, and not say particularly why, is not altogether so fair play. But pray expect not I should be as smart as you. *Bellarmin* never comes in your way, but you must have a Bout at sharps with him. I must confess he has given you some cause to bear him no great good will, but none to fall still into your *Burlesque* fits. For ought I perceive you would be as much at a loss for sport without *Bellarmin*, as some Pulpits for matter without the Pope. They are a pair of Gentlemen without whom, as hardly as you treat them, it seems you would not know what to do. Why cannot you follow the example of his sober stile, and my Lord *Falkland's* advice, to treat controversie with the softness of Love Letters? I have told you of this before, and cannot help it, if you will not out of your way. But you shall go alone for me. I like it not so well to keep you company in it.

To come to the matter; in proof of Divine Positive Law, there are in all four places alledged by *Bellarmin*. The two first are *Gen. 47.* where *Joseph* exempted the *Egyptian* Priests, and *1 Esdr. 7.* where *Artaxerxes* exempted the Priests of the Jews. These two indeed he touches but gently, and he has reason. The *Egyptian* Priests avoided the necessity of selling their Lands, by the allowances of Corn they had out of the Publick Granaries: *Artaxerxes* took from his Officers the power of imposing Tributes upon the Jewish Priests and Ministers; and these things are recorded in Scripture. This is the whole matter of fact, which *Bellarmin* barely hints, but says nothing to apply it to his purpose. I for my part, see not how it can be apply'd, unless it be first supposed that every thing contained in Scripture, even in the Historical parts, is positively commanded by God. And that is so far from true, that we see there are blameable and vicious actions inserted in the Sacred History as well as good. Not to go out of our present matter, who will make these examples equivalent to a positive Law of God, must likewise say it is the positive Law of God, that care be taken for the subsistence and priviledges of Idolatrous Priests (for so were the *Egyptians*) and that Ministers of state turn all Subjects into Slaves as soon as they get opportunity. These places are indeed against *Bellarmin*. For 'tis plain that both *Egyptians* and *Jews*, had what they had, from their several Princes. And this I think is not proof of Divine Right for Exemptions, but Divine Testimony that they proceeded from Human.

To these two places borrowed from the Gloss upon the Canon Law, out of deference, I suppose, more than needed to the Authority of the Glossator, *Bellarmin* adds two more of his own. The first from *Numb. 3.* where the *Levites* are by Gods appointment given to *Aaron* and his Successors; and God says several times expressly of them, *They are mine.* Were no body wiser than I, this place would prove no more than what need: no Scripture to prove it, it is so clear of it self: viz. That they belong to God in a special manner, whose whole business it is to attend to his service. But *Bellarmin* undertakes to prove out of it, a total exemption of the Clergy from the Tribunals of Princes. His discourse is this, *For those whom God chose for himself, to the Ministry of the Temple, and Holy.*

Holy things, He would have Subjects to the High Priest alone, who represented the place of God on Earth, and by this freed them from the Jurisdiction of the Princes of the Earth. To see how differently the same things will appear to different men ! Another in his place would have concluded quite contrary, and thought it plain enough, since the thing for which God chose the *Levites* is express to be the Ministry over which *Aaron* was appointed, that the subjection of the *Levites* to *Aaron* is restrained to the Ministry, leaving them in other respects as they were before.

However this is plain, that the whole force of his discourse lies in the word *Alone*, and 'tis plain that he has put in that word purely of his own head, without any manner of warrant from the Text, and besides manifestly contrary to what daily passes before our eyes. For nothing is more ordinary in the World, than for the same man to owe subjection to several powers in several respects. At School we obey our Masters, at home our Parents ; and yet Scholars and Children, Masters and Parents, and all are subject to the Magistrate. In what relates to our health, we obey the Physician ; in Sea matters, the Pilot ; in the concerns of our Fortune, the Lawyer ; the Prince, as well as others, is guided by them in such things, and yet all remain his Subjects. The Laity, as well as Clergy are subject to the Spiritual power in Spirituals, without prejudicing their subjection to the Temporal in Temporals. But 'tis idle to dilate on a thing so known and so obvious. It is enough to say that This, whether Argument or Supposition of *Bellarmin*, *The Levites were subject to Aaron, therefore they were subject to him alone*, is wholly ungrounded.

In what related to the Ministry, They were indeed to obey *Aaron* : in other things, for ought appears, they were still subject even to the Judges appointed by the advice of *Jethro*, and much more to *Moses* himself. Only he has set it off to the advantage, by saying, the High Priest *represented the place of God on Earth* : which sounds magnificently and awfully : otherwise, every Prince, and every Magistrate, and every Superiour represent the place of God too, as far as his power goes. And for *Aaron's*, it is expressly confin'd by the Text to the service of the Ministry. When the Army rested, the *Levites* were to receive orders from him about officiating in the Tabernacle, and
when

when it marched about carrying what belonged to the Tabernacle: yet none, I believe ever fancy'd, but that the orders to rest, and when, and which way, and how far to march, were given by some body besides *Aaron*.

The other, and only place out of the New Testament, is *Matth. 17.* about the Tribute, which our Saviour paid, but with a declaration that the Children of Kings are free. To save the trouble of turning over more Books, let us e'en refer this matter to *Bellarmin* himself. He tells us there are two interpretations of this place: some understanding it of a payment made every year to the Temple, others of an imposition laid by the *Romans*. According to the first, the force of the Argument he says is this, *The Kings of the Earth require not Tribute of their Children, therefore neither will the King of Heaven require Tribute of me, who am his true and natural Son.* This he thinks the true sence of the place; but withal, that the Argument holds too in the other exposition, according to which it runs in this manner. *The Princes of the Earth are but Ministers of the King of Heaven, and therefore ought not require Tribute of his Son.* According to both, *Bellarmin* confesses that the force of our Saviours discourse lies in this, that He was the natural Son of God. and that I think is to confess, that to apply it to any other, is to take away its force.

Notwithstanding, He will needs extend it to all the Clergy. For, says he, *when the Sons of Kings are exempted from Tribute, not their persons alone, but their Servants and Officers, and Families are exempted likewise.* Whether this may be said or no, methinks it is not for *Bellarmin* to say it. For in his judgment what our Saviour said, related to a Tribute required by God. Wherefore if he apply it to Tributes imposed by Secular Princes, he acts against his judgment. However, it is *Bellarmin* who speaks now, not Christ. Christ spoke only of himself; we hear nothing from him of Servants and Families, but barely of the Sons of Kings; and because we do not, have reason to believe, he meant not they should be comprehended in his discourse; for if he had, he would undoubtedly have comprehended them himself: and if it had been his pleasure to have his Family exempted, as he was himself, he would have signified it. It is manifest therefore, that what *Bellarmin* says, is without any warrant from Scripture. Besides, which ill becomes

becomes his learning, it is assuming for proof the very point to be proved. For calling the Clergy the Family of Christ, as he does in the following words, it is all one to ask whether the Clergy, or whether Christ's Family be exempted. Wherefore to assume without proof, as he plainly does, that Christ's Family is exempt, is to assume without proof that the Clergy are exempt. The place then teaches the Divinity of Christ, and to recede even from our right, rather than scandalize our Neighbour; the rest is ungrounded fancy.

As for what he adds, that our Saviour, by paying for *Peter*, seems to intimate, his Family too was free: I know not what may seem to *Bellarmin*, but am sure it does not seem so to every body. If that had been our Saviours reason, it seems he should have paid for the rest of the Apostles as well as *Peter*, who were all of the Family as well as he. Since they were left to the ordinary course of things, it seems to be our Saviours pleasure, that his Family should be left so, whatever were his reason to pay for *Peter*. I might pass over *St. Hierom* and *St. Austin*, whom he alledges; since they say nothing to his purpose. But to dissemble nothing, that which they say is this, That the Clergy do not pay Tribute, for the banour of God, and as being Children of the King of Heaven. And this is manifestly true, when Princes for the honour of God have exempted them. And it would be as true of the Laity, under a Pagan Prince, who should exempt them all, as *Artaxerxes* did the Jewish Priests. For even They are the Sons of God too, and Co-heirs of Christ. But that the exemption, of which the Fathers speak, was by the positive Law of God, which is the only question, neither of them do so much as seem to intimate.

He ends with some quotations out of Councils, with which I have no mind to meddle, it being to enter into the Question of the Authority of Councils. It will be enough to say briefly, that if his Councils be so circumstanc'd, as he himself requires they should be to engage our belief, and mean as he does, he has made a down-right Article of Faith of his opinion, and cannot allow for Catholick Authors, those who he says think otherwise. But this is more than even himself pretends. The Councils he cites, all but that of Trent, are not free from exemption, I think in his own opinion. And the

Council of Trent says, Ecclesiastical Immunities were instituted not *Jure Divino*, as some others speak, but *Ordinatione Divina*, & *Ecclesiasticis Sanctionibus*. He would persuade us the Council speaks in this manner, least people by *Divine Right*, should understand *Canon Law*, which for all *Panormitan*, who he says confutes it, is a Tenet ordinary enough. But by his favour, considering how tender the Council was all along to meddle with points controverted among Catholics, it is a great deal more likely the Council made choice of that expression, to leave those who are for *Jure Humano* to their liberty. For even they cannot except against that expression, since whatever happens in the World, by whatever means, happens by Divine Ordination. Wherefore the Council, as far as I can see, is so far from settling Bellarmin's opinion, that it allows the contrary. However it be, *Hic Rhodus, hic saltus*. Bellarmin undertakes to shew us the positive Law of God for exemptions. Let him do this, and not tell us what others think, or say of the matter, even in Council. For this is not the business now.

This is all that Bellarmin says upon this Head. But that he liv'd in a place where the Doctrine of Exemptions ran with a strong Current, and so in likelihood was carried away with the stream, it is strange a man of his parts should engage for any thing, for which he had so little to say. He fairly confesses at first there is no express command for what he would persuade us is the positive Law of God: and every body may see there is as little in his Arguments, as in the Text. At least he saw so much himself. For the most he attributes to them is bare Probability. Which is to say in plain English, It may be 'tis so, it may be 'tis not so: I know not whether it be or no. I were ill with the World if the Positive Law of God come once to *May be's*. Nor does it consist with his Providence to leave us groping in the dark to find out what his pleasure is with our uncertain guesses, and hit right and get to Heaven, if luck serve. For all our hopes of Heaven depend upon the observance of his Law, and if we have no better security of it than *May be's*, 'tis pure chance whether we go to Heaven or Hell, and we may even throw Dice for our Salvation. In short, These are Arguments of the power of Prejudice and nothing else. Bellarmin, I doubt, was deep in when he made them:

them. Who thinks them concluding, has a better opinion of them than He had, and must needs be in deeper.

And so we are come to the Arguments, by which he would intitle his Exemptions to Divine Natural Law. The first is the Custom of Nations; which seems rather Instance than Argument. He had resolv'd the Divine Right which he pretends into the Law of Nations, and now goes about to shew that several Nations have practis'd according to it. I must confess this substituting the Law of Nations for Divine Natural Law, will not down with me. It is promising one thing, and performing another. For all the World thinks them different, and he himself among the rest distinguishes them as Principles from Conclusions. Which Conclusions, if you will believe *St. Thomas*, must not be far off neither. Put them as he does, at such a distance, that there is no evident, no necessary connexion between them, and no body but himself can imagine they have any thing to do with the Law of Nature. But there being no need to ravel into that matter, let it pass. *Bellarmin* quotes for the Jews *Exod. 30.* and *Numb. 1.* for the Gentiles, *Aristotle*, *Cesar*, and *Plutarch*: for Christians, a Law of *Constantine*, and another of *Justinian*: not forgetting the forementioned instances of *Pharaoh*, and *Artaxerxes*, which it seems he thinks prove both Positive and Natural Law too. To list all these quotations minutely, would prove a business, and I love to spare my pains. I conceive we are to set aside what he alledges from *Exodus* and *Numbers*. For that the *Levites* paid not their half Sicle to the uses of the Tabernacle: and that the rest did, belongs not to the Natural but Positive Law of God. For the rest, all he saies is, that something has been done for the Clergy in all the Nations he mentions. Now because he took care before-hand, lest we should mistake, to admonish us, that there is no evident nor necessary Light of Nature to guide Nations in this particular, it remains that the Clergy were beholding to the Civil power for what they had. And this every body will freely grant him without troubling his Quotations.

Methinks this difference might be compounded. Rather than fall out, *Bellarmin* shall have it his own way for me. With all my heart let the Customs of Nations carry it. I am sure he is not so unreasonable, as to require that *Artaxerxes* should

In quantum
deri-
vatur à le-
ge naturali
per modum
conclusionis
quæ non est
multum re-
mota à
principijs,
St. Thom.
1. 2. q. 5.
art. 4. ad. 4.

should be bound by *Pharaoh's* Laws, or *Pharaoh* by the *Gauls*, or *Constantine* by any of them. Let the Clergy then be treated by every Nation according to their own Laws or Customs, and the business is at an end.

But 'twere good we understood one another. A Clergy man is not only a necessary man in a Common-wealth, but one who spends his whole life in the service of it. For the good of particulars, is the good of the whole, and his whole business is to perfect particulars. Now because it is impossible, that who spends all his time in one employment, should follow another, it is plain, that nothing is to be required of a Clergy-man, but the work of a Clergy-man. Whatever callings others follow, whether by inclination, or for advantage, or perhaps by constraint, none can be put upon the Clergy-man but his own. I except cases of necessity, where Clergy-men too sometimes turn Souldiers. This is not to undertake a new calling, but to suspend their own, and that for a short time. As soon as the necessity is over, They are as they were before. Nay a Clergy-man cannot live as a Clergy-man, if he be forc'd to labour so much as for his living. 'Tis true, *St. Paul* upon occasion set his hand to Tent-making after he was an Apostle: But to follow his example, I think one should be in his circumstances, extraordinarily and miraculously, and without his own labour, capacitated for his function. Otherwise, who must take the ordinary way of study, will find there goes so much time to get the knowledge, which is requisite for him; so much to preserve it; so much to exercise it: that there will be none to spare for any thing else. Regularly speaking 'tis necessary Provision be made for him out of our Saviours stock, *Dignus est operarius mercede sua*. The Clergy-man is therefore, by the incompatibility of them with his function, exempted from the Duties of other employments, and has a good title from Nature to such exemptions. For Nature plainly teaches that who has his full load, ought not carry more. And this is common to all Vocations as well as the Clergy. Who is obliged to fight for the Commonwealth, is exempt from Tilling the Ground; who administers Justice, from fighting; and so of the rest. No body I conceive would have any thing to say to *Bellarmin*, for deriving the Exemptions of the Clergy from Nature, if this were what he meant by Exemptions.

But

But the Question is, Whether the Exemptions he pretends, *In rebus politicis tum quoad personas, tum quoad Bona*, as he speaks, be taught by Nature? Truly, I am a very ill Scholar in Natures School, if they be. Subjection in both seems so far from Incompatible with their function, that I see not how it is prejudicial, and conceive They may pass very well without those exemptions, and better than with them. I perceive nothing in his Argument towards opening my eyes. That which he saies is indeed true. Many Nations, all if he please, have given exemptions to the Clergy, such as they were: neither do we need Instances to prove a thing has happened, which we know before-hand by Reason must have happened. But it is nothing to the purpose: for we are not a jot the nearer knowing that his exemptions are due to the Clergy from Nature, by knowing that they have had exemption in all Nations. When he proves that his Exemptions are of the number of those, which the Clergy has enjoy'd always, and every where, he will have spoken to the Question. But 'tis too much to expect we should believe no Nation has ever meddled with their Persons and Goods, when he goes not about to prove it so much as of anyone. The truth is, the Argument is as plain a Sophism as can be. Exemptions have been used in all Nations, therefore these Exemptions have been in all Nations, is just the same as if he should Argue, Drink is used in all Nations, therefore Wine is used in all Nations. I conceive therefore I may let his Quotations alone, till they be applyed to his purposes, and in the mean time content my self with seeing that the Argument is nothing to the Question.

The second Argument compares the Ecclesiastical and Secular Powers to the Spirit and Flesh in man. *The Spirit*, says he, *though it binder not the actions of the Flesh, when they are as they should be, yet governs and moderates it, sometimes keeping it back, sometimes urging it forward, as it judges expedient for its own end. But the Flesh has no power over the Spirit, nor can direct, or judge, or restrain it in any thing. So the Ecclesiastical Power, which is Spiritual, and by that means naturally Superiour to the Secular, may, when 'tis needful, direct, judge, and restrain it, but by no means be directed, judged, or restrained by it.* This out-runs the

Con-

ye Council say to ye

Constable. By this account the Laity are subject to the Clergy in all things, and the Clergy to the Laity in nothing. Which if it be true, Exemptions are a pitiful matter not worth talking of. For what need has an intire Superiority of Exemptions? Nay, with what good fence can they be applyed to it? An Inferiour indeed cannot command his Superior; but to say the Superiour is exempt from the Inferiour, is a new language. We say he is above him, not exempt from him. This Doctrine turns the scales strangely. Instead of inquiring whether the Clergy be exempt from the Laity, as far as I see, the Laity will be put to their shifts to get Exemptions from the Clergy. However it be, that which *de Harmin* assumes, is a great deal more than that which he would prove by it, and more ado there will be to get it pass. For the Laity, who contest even Exemptions, will never be brought to acknowledge a total Superiority without unresistable conviction, unless that Superiority be restrained to Spirituals, which as it was never contested, so it hinders not the Superiority which they claim in Temporals.

As for the Argument, it were an easie matter to get rid of it by a blunt denial. For how does it appear, that the two Powers are to one another, as the Spirit and the Flesh? *St. Gregory Nazianzen*, said so in a certain Sermon, and others have taken it upon his credit. Be it so. How does it appear that *St. Gregory*, and those who follow him are not all mistaken? 'Twere something harsh to say so; but yet who did, were at an end of the Argument. For there is no other proof, save a hint of what he has done in his Book *de Pont.* where he only tells the same story more at large.

But to use *St. Gregory* with more respect, let us reflect that a Preacher is one thing, a Disputer another: and therefore what may be very proper for *St. Gregory*, may ill become *Bellarmin*. For many things are very plausible, and very patina a Pulpit, which will not endure the Test of a severe examination elsewhere. And this happens no more ordinarily than in similitudes. For being generally used, not so much to prove, as to imprint lively in the minds of the Auditory what is proved otherwise, they lose both their beauty and force when they are rack'd into severe proofs. I have not *St. Gregory* by me, to speak with certainty of his meaning, or know how much.

much he says of what is put upon him. But I see, as much similitude as he found to his purpose, the cases are unlike enough. The Flesh indeed is subject to the Spirit, or rather acted by it, because taken in contradistinction to it. It is a meer dead clod, which does nothing at all. And though it could: to govern, and direct, and judge, are Actions quite out of its sphere, and of which the Spirit alone is capable. Did *St. Gregory*, does *Bellarmin* himself, or any man in his senses, think in earnest it is so between the two Powers? Is not the Secular as active as the Spiritual? Nay, is not this all the complaint, that it is too active? Can it not govern, and direct, and judge as truly? On the one side therefore we have an Agent and no Agent, on the other two Agents: and yet he would persuade us that these cases are alike, and that *St. Gregory* thought so.

But let the Similitude be what it will, what is it to us? What have we to do with Powers, who are talking of men? It will be time enough to inquire how the Powers are to one another, when it is our business. At present we have other work in hand. *Bellarmin* saies, the Clergy are exempted from Punishment and Tribute. This Clergy are men, and we are examining whether what he says of them be true. Let him not amuse us with Powers. Powers do not pay Tribute, or appear at the Bar. Nor does the Secular Magistratè, or power, pretend to judge, or restrain the Spiritual power. Marry to the man who has it, when by criminal Actions he becomes unworthy of it, the Secular Magistratè does pretend he has something to say. And he may say what he will for *Bellarmin*. For he takes no further care than for the Power, which no body offers to touch, but leaves the poor man in the lurch. And so this similitude which so much pleases *Bellarmin*, that he has it up at every turn, is as bad an Argument as can be. It is neither proved, nor any thing to purpose if it were.

The truth is, here is a plain business clouded with learned handling. Take away the Scholastical appearances of Authority of Fathers, similitudes and Arguments, and who can tell ten, can see all that is in it. Every body knows there are two powers in the World, the Spiritual and the Temporal, and every body knows men are subject to both. This is no

news,

news. Now we must needs be told that the Spiritual power is to the Temporal, as the Spirit to the Flesh. Which if it signifie that the Spiritual power is, as *Bellarmin* phrases it, naturally superiour to the Temporal, and so the Temporal acts with the leave and according to the pleasure of the Spiritual, it is manifestly false. For the Powers are both supreme, and independent of one another, as we have discours'd formerly. Nor can St. *Gregory* of all men, be thought to mean so, who if *Caron* cite him right, says, the Temporal power is supreme (*Summa*) and full, and liable to the pleasure or command of no other. Besides that elsewhere, he expressly includes himself in the number of those who are to obey the higher powers for conscience, and in force of a Law clearly promulgated by the Holy Ghost. But if it signifie that all men, even those who have the greatest Temporal power are subject to the Spiritual, it is very true. The Sword which Kings bear exempts them not from the Keys. In this sense I guess St. *Gregory* meant it, because the similitude, though not altogether exact, yet is not amiss, nor misbecoming his learning. For the Secular man is, as the Flesh, ignorant in the waies of the Spirit, and though he were knowing, the power of the Keys is not given to him. Indeed he is not altogether guided as the Flesh by the Spirit; but similitudes must not be search'd too near. All this goes well. But why so much cackling for this Egg? Balk them not with the crack of learning, and men will croud into this toyl of their own accord. This subjection to the Spirit is but in the waies of the Spirit. And all the story in two words of plain *English* is but this, In Spiritual things men are subject to the Spiritual power. And who needs St. *Gregory*, or *Bellarmin* to tell him that?

With all this ado, we are but just where we were. The Secular man is indeed subject to the Spiritual power in Spirituals; but why is not the Spiritual man subject to his power in Temporals? Because, says *Bellarmin*, the Flesh never governs the Spirit, and the Secular man is as the Flesh. Yes in Spirituals; but in Temporals He, and He alone has the knowledge. The Spiritual man is as ignorant in them, as he in Spirituals. He too, and He alone has the power. For the same hand which gave the Keys to Bishops, gave the Sword to Kings. Where-

fore He is now the Spirit, and the Spiritual man the Flesh. And so the very similitude which was brought for exemption does in truth prove subjection.

I have been the longer upon this point, because the same clew will guide us through all the Labyrinths. Here the Clergy are the Spirit; afterwards, Fathers, and Shepherds, and the Lot of God. And all this is but the same stuff cut into several fashions, which makes not the Web the stronger. He says then, for a third Argument, that *'tis against nature for Children to rule their Parents, or Sheep their Shepherd; and the Clergy are Fathers, and Shepherds.* True; but as they were the Spirit before, in respect of Spirituals: in relation to Temporals the Magistrate is the Father and Shepherd. And so we ordinarily call good Princes the Fathers of their
 Ifay 44, & Country, and a Temporal Prince is called by God himself
 45 his Shepherd, and his Christ too. Sure *Bellarmin* will not perswade many, that a man is a Father and a Pastor, when he breaks the Laws, and refuses to contribute to the necessities of his Country. To do so, is not to feed, and keep the Wolf away, but to starve, and let the Wolf in to devour the Flock. And that we should be obliged to look upon and treat a man as a Father and Pastor, when he is not so, but the quite contrary, whoever may teach, nature does not. This Argument, like the former, flies in his face who makes it. We need Spiritual food, and Spiritual direction, and to be preserved from the Spiritual Wolf the Devil. We need also Temporal food and direction, and safety from the Temporal Wolf, the Enemy. The Clergy needs all this as much as other folks: and therefore as they are Fathers and Pastors, in as much as they supply our Spiritual wants: so they are Children and Sheep, in as much as they receive Temporal things from others, and so by nature obliged to obey their Temporal Fathers and Pastors.

Bellarmin Objects this very thing against himself, and Answers, That a Prince is indeed a Spiritual Child, and Sheep of the Priest, but the Priest can in no wise be called the Child or Sheep of the Prince. And that for a very strange reason; because Priests and all Clergy-men have a Spiritual Prince of their own, by whom they are governed, not only in Spirituals, but in Temporals too. But can the Notion of Father and Shepherd

herd be apply'd to that Spiritual Prince in respect of Temporals? Does he provide Temporal Pastures for the Clergy? Is it from him they have safety and quiet when they feed? Does he drive the Wolf away? We see with our eyes those things are done by the Temporal Prince; and these, and the like, being the things which ground the Notion of Father and Shepherd in Temporals, these Notions as evidently belong to the Prince, as the Actions. This which *Bellarmin* says, is extremely absurd and intolerably pernicious on other accounts. But I mind not the *Position*, but the *Answer*. Since the Prince breeds and nourishes, feeds and secures Priests, as well as others in the Politick life: it is plain he has in that respect the Notion of Father and Shepherd even to them: and *Bellarmin* has no manner of Reason to deny they may be called Children and Sheep, and obliged to do what nature teaches Children and Sheep ought to do.

The fourth Argument is this, *The Clergy are the Ministers of God, consecrated to his service alone, and offered by the whole people for that purpose, whence they have their name as belonging to the Lot of God. But the Princes of the World certainly can have no right over those things which are offered and consecrated to God, and made as it were his proper goods.* If I had a mind to Dispute of Etymologys, or thought it worth while to maintain against him, that the Clergy have their name, rather because God is their Lot, than They Gods, there would be enough to take my part. But I love not to lose time: for which reason too I forbear to except against all that is exceptionable in the Argument. It will be sufficient to say, that it differs little in substance from its fellows, only it is set forth in another manner. The Service, and Lot of God, are but what he called Spirit and Pastors before. And the same Key will serve to the Lock. In as much as they are the Lot of God, and in respect of his Service, to which they are consecrated, the Clergy are unaccountable to the Secular Power: but when they divest themselves of the Clergy-man, and wear only the man, that man, if he deserve to feel the Secular Sword, may, for any thing I see in the Argument. Wick- edness is sure no part of God's Lot, nor can I imagine how the privilege of his service should be pretended where there

is no service of his ; nay, where the pretender acts directly contrary to it. Were it true, that Princes had nothing to do with things belonging to God, or men consecrated to his Service, all Christians, and all things seem in a fair way towards Exemptions, as well as Clergy-men. For God has a very true property in all Things, and Christians are all, and that very solemnly, consecrated to his service. They serve him indeed in another way than the Clergy, but they truly serve him, and are by solemn consecration obliged to that service. Since we see that service is so far from exempting them from subjection to Princes, that obedience to them is part of it, it is plain there is no repugnance betwixt the service of God and subjection to Princes, unless they command things contrary to that service. And from such commands all men are exempt as well as the Clergy ; with this difference, that the Clergy are exempt from all that is contrary to the service of Clergymen, the rest only from what is contrary to the service of Christians.

Yet *Bellarmin* would bear us in hand, that what he says is certain, and tells us that *the Light of Reason shews it, and God has not obscurely delivered it in the last of Leviticus. Whatsoever is once consecrated to God, shall be Holy of Holys to the Lord.* The Light of Reason may indeed do much, when he makes it appear : but He, who is so much for Exemptions, should methinks allow us to be exempt from the Ceremonial Law. The Chapter he cites takes order about the offerings made to God, and appoints some to be redeemed, others not. But those commands are given to the Jews ; we see nothing like them in the Christian Law. And no body knows better than himself, that we are to be guided by our own, not their Law, and that it lays no obligation on us purely as their Law, though the matter of it do sometimes bind us on the score of Reason. He says indeed, that 'tis so in this case, but barely to say so is not to prove. His word, if that were the business, would go far with me ; but when he is making Arguments, I expect an Argument. I say no more at present, because this I conceive is as much as needs for an Answer, and I intend to discourse of the merits of this cause more at large hereafter.

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The fifth and last Argument is from signs and Prodigys, shewn, as he says, by God on those who have presumed to violate Ecclesiastical Immunities. For proof of this, he sends us to one *Bredembachius*, an Author I have never seen, and therefore not knowing, nor having means to know particulars, can only answer in general. If the signs and Prodigys, he talks of, be true Miracles, and those express to the point, clearly wrought in confirmation of Immunities extended as far as *Bellarmin* stretches them, though I am slow of belief, yet if it be truly so, I will wash my hands of the business. God forbid I should doubt of any thing, let it seem never so strange, and never so cross to my reason, which carries his seal to it uncounterfeited. But I am strongly perswaded there is no such matter. If there were, *Bellarmin* is a strange man to amuse us with his probabilities, and unnecessary consequences, when he had proof in store infinitely more convictive than even demonstration it self. A Miracle may, perhaps, have been done to shew God's care of the Church, or Ministry. He is not less powerful now than heretofore in his Judgments upon *Nadab* and *Abiu*, *Oza* and *Ozias*. But Miracles are not lightly to be believed, and when they are manifest, *Bellarmin's* Doctrine may be ne'r the truer, unless they come home to it. In likelihood, who had *Bredembachius* to see what he says, would find no more than observations of signal, perhaps unusual and unhop'd prosperities happening to some who favoured the Clergy, and crosses to those who did otherwise; which his, whether piety or bigotry enhances into Miracles. If this be all the Fire to the smoke, the Topick ill becomes *Bellarmin's* learning. Who had the Malice to collect all that History affords of adversity to the good, and prosperity to the bad, might perhaps make as big a Book as that of *Bredembachius*. For 'tis an old complaint, and that of a Wise man too, that all things happen alike to the Good and the Bad: as if God had no care of the World, while in truth he has the greater by letting things happen so, and by that Providence teaching us not to value the Goods of this World, but raise our hearts to better. I am the apter to think there is no more in it; because *Bellarmin* himself makes a famous business of what I should not have thought worth alledging. As for Prodigys

digys and Signs, as many as there be in *Bredembachius*, he had no mind it seems to become Voucher so much as for one; for he cited not any. But he tells us, the Emperour *Basilius Porphyrogenitus* laies all the Calamities of that time to the charge of a certain Law made by *Nicephorus Phocas* against Ecclesiastical Immunity, and says that since that Law was in force, all things went to wrack. And this he calls a remarkable Testimony. As if that Emperour had been made acquainted with the Counsels of God, and seen the secret springs of Providence, which set the wheels of Prosperity and Adversity in motion; or as if worldly Prosperities were to be look'd on by Christians as the reward of vertue. However a body would think it went not much better with the *Greek* Empire after that Law than before, when notwithstanding the abrogating that Law, it was finally swallowed up by the *Turks*. And now I have mentioned the *Turks*, I remember They Argue something after this manner, when from their success They urge, that God has declared in favour of Mahumetism against Christianity. And with them I leave the Argument, to whom it is a great deal more suitable than to Christians.

So end *Bellarmin's* Arguments, and so might end my Letter, but that, not content with knowing how the waters relish, you expect to have the Spring dam'd up. It is a Task which asks a better Workman, and besides is not the work of a Letter. One half indeed, the claim he makes to the Positive Law of God, needs no more trouble: A plain denial is confutation in abundance; for unless he could shew that Positive Law, which he pretends, the pretence is plainly groundless. To unriddle fully the other half, it would be fit to search into the Law of Nature; for how shall we understand what it commands, unless we first know what it is? Now that is a Question about which men are not agreed, and who would undertake to dispute it from the beginning, and separate the pure Oar of Truth from the Dross of several mistakes, would cut out Work for a Volume. That it is nothing but Reason is sufficiently known: but all Laws being grounded on Reason, they would all be natural, unless their differences were settled by a more particular account. *Bellarmin*, I conceive, does not afford us light enough to see our way.

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He puts three degrees: First principles; conclusions evidently following; and conclusions not evidently following, but which need human Constitution. The two first, he says, belong properly to the Law of Nature; the third is the Law of Nations, which according to the Doctrine of *St. Thomas*, he distinguishes from Civil Law, in that the one is derived from nature, as Conclusions from Premises, the other as a determination of Generals to Particulars. As if it be Natural, that who offends be punish'd, it is Civil, that he be punish'd with this or that punishment. I know not whether the Authority of *St. Thomas* himself will preserve even that distinction wholly from Question. Possibly among Laws confessedly Civil, there may be found proper deductions from Reason, and among those of Nations, determination of generals to particulars. But whatever be of that matter, *St. Thomas* is far enough from vouching what *Bellarmin* says. He, as I observed before, requires that the Conclusions, which he makes the Law of Nations, be not far removed from their principles. Wherefore *Bellarmin's* second branch of the Law of Nature is the Law of Nations to him. Of the third branch there is no news in him, nor could he make Law of Nature of it, if there were. He is not a man to take an invident and unnecessary conclusion, for a conclusion; and therefore if he would allow it derived from nature at all, he could allow it only by way of Determination, not of conclusion; that is, for pure Civil, not Law of Nature or Nations. Put it then to *St. Thomas*, and our Exemptions, which are only the third way derived from Nature, owe themselves to the Civil Law, and have no more title to the Law of nature than all Laws; for all are grounded on Reason.

I am mistaken as well as you, if *Bellarmin* do not in effect say as much himself. For the Law of Nature is universally agreed to be imprinted in us without, and before Constitutions: wherefore to make us a Law of Nature which needs human Constitution, is to make us a Law of Nature, which is not a Law of Nature. Indeed Human Constitution is but another word for Civil Law; unless you restrain Civil Law to one City or Common-wealth. But there is no place for that restriction here. If we were distinguishing

guishing the Laws of men, those of Nations one with another might stand on the one side, and those of one Nation among themselves on the other. But while we are speaking of Civil Law in contradistinction to the Law of Nature, all Constitutions of men, whether of one or more Nations, belong to Civil Law, as in truth they turn all on the same hinges. Wherefore to say his Exemptions need human Constitution, is to say they need Civil Law, and *Bellarmin* though he had a mind to speak big, does in reality agree with those who derive them from Civil power, as you have rightly observed.

But not to stray into every winding of the Labyrinth, let us take what *Bellarmin* gives. To follow Good, and avoid Evil, He and all men say is a precept of the Law of Nature, and that in the most proper and most undisputable acceptation of the word. It is plain then that Nature commands not any thing which may happen to be bad. For if what may happen, ^{shall be} it will be bad, and we obliged by Nature to avoid it. Now there is in truth nothing perfectly and every way Good, but God himself; all other things may be good and bad in several respects. But whatever good there is in a thing, if it exclude a greater good, it is to be look'd on as simply bad. Of all the Goods shew'd down by the bounty of God upon men, keeping ourselves within the bounds of Nature, there is none which can bear comparison with the good of Government, the source and security of all the rest. ^{shall be} Whatever is inconsistent with it, is opposite to the greatest good of Mankind, and must put on the Notion of Bad, even though it might otherwise bear the denomination of Good. Again, nothing is more firmly, nor more evidently settled on Nature. And since no Power directed by Judgment, and least of all Nature, which is directed by the perfection of Judgment, can command Incompatibles, it is plain there can be no command of Nature for any thing incompatible with Government. I conceive then, that without anatomizing the Question of the Law of Nature, your curiosity may be satisfied, if we can find the Exemptions in question inconsistent with Government. For it will be as evident, they can have no preference, either to the Law of God, or Nature, as it is that neither God nor Nature command any thing contrary to the good

Reason can not doubt
of the Law of Nature.

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good of Mankind, or incompatible with other commands of both, or either.

Let us then briefly reflect, that a Common-wealth is a multitude of men united together for the benefits resulting from the Union. Those benefits *Aristotle* tells us, are all sorts of Goods, and that in abundance, and so as to need nothing out of the Common-wealth. To deduce them particularly will be needless. For 'tis obvious that as much as we need, whether for the convenience or necessity of life, and as much Industry as we may use to get them, no man out of community could call any thing his own, or though he could, were able to keep it, or count longer on it, than till a stronger than himself took a fancy to it. 'Tis Law which determines, and Law which secures property, and Laws are nothing but Rules of men in Community. Take that away and you turn the World into a Wilderness, where men will stray in a wretched and remediless confusion, pinch'd with want, and expos'd to all sorts of violence. Now because no end can be attain'd without means, nor means used without being known, of necessity to attain the end of a Common-wealth there must be some to make known, and direct the means to be used upon occasion, others to pursue those directions. So what was barely multitude before, becomes now a Body, consisting of a Head to order for the good of the whole, and Members to be ordered by it. And in the submission of the members to those orders consists the Union, which gives the name and Notion to a Common-wealth.

This submission cannot be purely voluntary, so that men obey at pleasure, when and as far as they think fit. For not to mention the absurdity of making the Common-wealth depend on Capricio's, unable to act, or even subsist with steadiness, the very notion of submission implies obligation. For it signifies that the member is to be ordered by the Head, and who is at the ordering of another, plainly cannot dispose of himself. Again, there being nothing in man to be submitted but Understanding and Will, and Understanding while it lies hid, and discovers not itself by outward effects, not falling under the Verge of human power, there remains only Will, the principle of Actions, which can be submitted. But where the Will is subject, 'tis plain it cannot be free,

Perfecta societas Civitatis est, que ad summum jam, ut ita dicam, omnis copie bonis omnibus cumulatæ, nihilq; prætere æquirentis fastigium pervenit.
Arist. polit. lib. 1.

or not subject. It will perhaps be impertinent to add, that this obligation on the one side to obey, cannot be without power on the other to command. Nor can there be greater or more palpable non-sence, than that there should be a Head to order the Members, without power to order them, a Head being nothing but such a power lodg'd in one or more persons. But 'twill be fit to reflect a little upon this power.

As the whole is evidently so many men, so the power of the Whole is plainly the power of so many men. And since every man has power over himself, and what he has, and the power of every one is transferred to the Head, the Head has plainly power over every man, and what every man has. So that whatever propriety men have by Law in their Goods, or liberty of their actions, 'tis all with subordination to the supreme power, which has a greater and paramount authority over those very Goods and Actions, and may and ought dispose of them as the common good requires. Neither is any thing more reasonable; nor can it be otherwise. For 'tis only by conjunction with the whole, and as a part of it, that any man has any thing. That this Land, or House is mine, and not another mans, is only because it is come to me in such a manner as the Laws of that Society whereof I am a Member, have appointed to make it mine. 'Tis only by the same conjunction a man can keep what he has. Any one that is stronger than he might take it from him, but that the whole in which he lives takes his part, joyned to which he is how stronger than the other, and fears him not. Wherefore since 'tis the whole which gives, and secures to every man all he has, the good of the whole is more his good than his private goods can be, and he is wrong'd if when any thing he has is necessary for the good of the whole, it be not dispos'd that way. To grumble at parting with something, when otherwise we have nothing, is a pitch of folly at which fordidness it self I think is not yet arrived. Again, it cannot, as I said, be otherwise. No end can be compassed either without means, or with means out of our power. Wherefore to put a Head to look after the good of the Body, without power over the means necessary to compass that good is manifest non-sence. These means being

being evidently the Persons and Things within the Commonwealth, the Head must either have power to dispose of both for the good of the whole, or not be a Head.

For which reason that power cannot be separated from it, no not by the Head it self, much less by any body else, and 'twould be ill with men if it could. You may as well separate Rational from man; for that is not more essential to man, than Power to Head. But were it possible, and the Head could strip it self of its power or Headship, it might also, and must by doing so, strip the man; whom he puts out of his power, of his Membership. For plainly ~~not~~ Head, no Member. And then, besides that he would be out of the care of the Head, which is confin'd to the Members, he might at pleasure or upon fancy, lose all the benefits he enjoys by being a Member; and those we have found are both the greatest and all the comforts and aids of life. But I spare this consideration, because I think it will return again. In the mean time, we have in a Commonwealth Power in the Head inseparable, and unconfin'd, and which both may and ought to dispose of all Persons and Things within the Commonwealth for the common good; and in the Members, obligation to concur to, or obey that disposition, and all this with a necessity so absolute, that that who takes either away, takes away the Commonwealth too. It remains to look now upon our Exemptions.

Those, of which you are Sollicitous, are Exemptions of the Persons of Clergy-men from the Tribunals, and of their goods from the Taxes of Secular Princes. Peradventure there needs no more to confute both, than to assume without more ado, that the Clergy are Members of the Commonwealth. It is a proposition which one would think needs no proving, and yet the dispute is at an end, if it be granted. Members are subject; They are Members, therefore they are subject, is pretty evident; and that subjection goes to the very Notion of Member, is already discours'd. Notwithstanding since *Bellarmin* with an inconstancy, which shews he was at a loss, sometimes plainly grants, sometimes in effect denies it, let us cast away a little time upon it.

The end of a Common-wealth being the good of those who compose it, If we stop at the goods of this life, a Clergy-man perhaps is no necessary Ingredient to a Common-wealth. For Peace and Plenty, quiet and security, and whatever relates purely to this World, may be had without him. But take a Common-wealth, for a Society designing and providing for the whole good of man, and a Clergy-man cannot be spared, because on him depends the chief, and in truth the only good of man, *viz.* advancing in the way to Final Bliss. For other things bear not that name with propriety; farther than as they contribute to this good: on the contrary they are hinders when they hinder it, as they always do when they do not advance it. Pleasure, and Riches, and what the World calls Prosperity, as much as our vanity prizes them, are in reality wretched miseries, when they are loved for themselves, and not used for means to better ends. And the Cobler and Beggar is much a happier man, than he that flourishes in Coaches, and Palaces, if he uses what God sends better. A Common-wealth therefore is not perfect; and in *Aristotle's* language, *Nihil extra se desiderans*, nor able to attain the end of a Common-wealth, the good of man, in which there are no means to compass This, as well as other Goods, nor is the Good for which we are created, the care of which no man can put off, and much less a Society of men. This good we plain we cannot have but by the Clergy. It is intrusted to them by God, from whom they received the knowledge of saving truths, and command to teach them to the end of the World. Wherefore whatever be of a Common-wealth, considered purely with relation to the good of this life, a Christian Common-wealth cannot be without a Clergy-man. A Magistrate to end differences, a Soldier to fight, an Artificer, an Husbandman, or who else is requisite for convenience or plenty, may as well and better be spared, than he who furnishes the Common-wealth with a greater and more necessary good, and without which the quiet, and security, and plenty, and whatever others contribute, is useless. And since 'tis evident that They are all Members, and necessary Members of the Common-wealth, because the end of a Common-wealth cannot be had without them, 'tis evident also the Clergy-man is a necessary Member too, and more necessary

sary than any of them, because he is a necessary means to a more necessary part of the end of a Common-wealth.

'Tis tedious to lose words in a matter determinable almost by Eye-sight. For do we not see They make in most places one, and the first of the three Orders or States, which represent the Body of the Common-wealth? With us indeed They do not make a distinct order, but yet They have their place to the Representatives of the Kingdom. Methinks 'tis something an extravagant business to be put to prove that they are Members, who are every where acknowledged for principal Members. Again, Do we not see they Inherit, and Purchase, and Convey, and do all which men are impower'd by Ballot, and Membership to do, and to which only Members are admitted with exclusion of Aliens? In case of wrong, do they not draw the waters of relief from the great source common to all the Members? And if their Prince deny them Justice, do they not think he breaks his Coronation Oath to render it impartially to all his subjects? Do they not claim and receive their share in all the advantages and privileges of Members, and to which they could have no Title or Pretence if they were not Members? In short, there is no proving any man a Member, if they be not. For all the Topics which can be used for any, hold for them; nor is it more repugnant to nature, and incompatible with the Notion of a Common-wealth, that a Member is not subject to the Head, than it is to common sense that They are not Members.

Lightly then one shall not meet with a wilder fancy than that of *Bellarmin*, when he says, the Clergy are but material, not formal parts of the Common-wealth, and have a Prince and Tribunals of their own. I doubt They have no great reason to thank him, for his subtilty. For should they be sent to that Prince, and those Tribunals for Justice is often as they need it (and who but their own Prince is to take care of them?) their complaints perchance might oblige him to think of a second *Recognition*. But yet even so much is enough to spoil his Market. For bare material living in any Country, subjects a mans person to the Laws of that Country, and the Goods he has there to Taxes. Aliens are every where protected, while they break not the Laws; but if they do, it will not avail them to plead, they are not formal parts of the

the Common-wealth. They are punish'd as natives, according as the Law of the place in which they are, not their own, appoints. They pay Polls likewise, and their share in other Taxes, if they have any thing liable to the Tax. Wherefore though *Bellarmin* went as far as ever he could to find out this *Formally*, and cannot go farther though he would never so fain, unless he blind folks: (For people who have their eyes can see where the Clergy materially live) yet this Formality will do the Clergy no good, the material share which he cannot deny them, drawing along with it a share in punishments, when they deserve it, and Taxes too. And as the Clergy are no way advantaged, the Common-wealth I believe will be as little concern'd in his subtlety. So they can punish the persons, and affect the goods, I suppose they will not mind much with what Formalities men of speculation amuse themselves.

But let us look upon those Exemptions a little nearer. That Common-wealth I conceive is sickly, and not like to live long, where the members are not protected from injury, and provision made for their quiet. But where is no power to do it, there can be no Common-wealth. For a Common-wealth is the means to procure quiet and safety, for which men joyn and continue in Society. There can be no means to procure them, if it have no power to procure them, and so ceases to be a Common-wealth, and becomes an independent unfociated multitude, standing every one on his own guard, and at War with his Neighbour. Know not whether it may be called so much as a *Heard* of a kind of rational Beasts, preying as meer Beasts, the stronger upon the weaker. Now the power of the whole Body being, as has been discours'd, in the Head or Prince, the Prince must have power to right his subjects in case of wrong, or there can be neither Head nor Body. Neither is it material from whence the wrong comes. Whoever does it, whether Native or Alien, in or out of his Dominions, become Subject to his Prince whom he has wrong'd, as far as concerns reparation. Relief is sought at his hands, and he gives it by forcing the offender to amends, if he be within his reach, or if he be not, 'tis just to pursue him where he is, and right his Subjects by War.

This Reason indispensably subjects Clergy-men to the power of the Prince, even though they had, according to *Bellarmin's* extravagant conceit, another Prince of their own. For 'tis not what they are, or to whom they belong, but what They may do. If they can do wrong, we need not look for more. And that they may do wrong, is something too plain. Whatever Exemptions they claim or have, they have none from the corruption of Nature. 'Twere to be wish'd they had. That one Exemption would be more worth than all the rest. But they may, and alas! do fall sometimes as well as others, and need as well as others the fear of punishment, to awe the crookedness of Nature into some straightness. It would sound harsh, and shew perhaps invidious, to dilate this Head into all sorts of wickedness, and shew what might be done, and must be suffered, if there were no help for it. Let it suffice that to deny the Prince a power over them, when they happen to break the Laws and fall into crimes, is to abandon private men to all the wrongs, which the Clergy may be tempted to do, and want virtue to resist the Temptation; to abandon the publick to the remediless danger of machinations, if at any time they arrive at the height of wickedness, Treason. In short, 'tis to deny the Prince to be Prince; For he is plainly no Prince who has no power to right his Subjects. By the way, to avoid mistakes, let me declare once for all, by Prince I mean all along the subject of supreme power wheresoever lodged, in one or more persons, according to the different constitutions of different Common-wealths. That variety is nothing to me, and I will not embroil my self in unconcerning things.

It may perhaps be thought that these are cavils and surmizes, and that the goodness of Clergy-men is wrong'd by being so much as suspected of doing wrong to others, and that however at worst right may upon complaint be had against as many as own him, whom *Bellarmin* makes their Prince. But I doubt there is more of Bigottery, than sense in those thoughts. Not that I question the goodness of the Clergy. But 'tis not for men to change the security of relief, when they need it, which they have from their Head as Members, into a faint, and possibly deceitful confidence of a private mans virtue.

And

And then to seek relief from any but ones own Prince, to omit that 'tis unpracticable, and has a hundred insuperable inconveniences besides, 'tis plainly against the nature and end of a Common-wealth. For men live united to obtain redress of wrongs by their union, and would quickly break it, if they be forc'd to seek it elsewhere, and where the very pursuit of it may chance prove as great a wrong, as that whereof they pursue redress.

As these things are too plain to be a secret any where, they are understood in Italy it self, and when time was, were actually pleaded. 'Twas urged in behalf of the *Venetians*, in their contests about this matter with *Paul V*, That the power of punishing offences against the Laws, could not be separated from the supreme Power, and that to say a Prince had any body in his Dominions not subject to him in Temporal matters, or any other concerning the publick good, was all one as to say he was not Prince. To make which discourse the more striking They brought it to his own door, and alledged, That the Pope exempted indeed from Bishops and Archbishops, but could not exempt from himself without ceasing to be Pope. They urged also, what peradventure is more sensible in a Country so impatient of injuries, but yet ruinous every where; That the Laity being wrong'd by the Clergy, and not revenged by the Magistrate, will revenge themselves; and which is worse, out of despair of being righted when they are once wronged, study to be before-hand, and prevent the wrongs they fear. Which what a gate it sets open to the disturbance and ruine of the Common-wealth, is needless to be mentioned.

I have not been solicitous particularly of the Exemption from Taxes claim'd by *Bellarmin*, because I think it will not be hard to get his consent, that the Goods of the Clergy go along with their Persons. Nevertheless we may briefly reflect, which I think was hinted before, that the Prince, or supreme power is to provide for the security of the whole; that provision cannot be made without means; that these means being in the hands of particulars, unless they may be taken out of those hands, to be employ'd for the publick good, as occasion requires, no provision can be made, and the end of Society is lost. And since the Clergy have their share, oftentimes a very large one, in the goods of the Common-wealth, as they can hardly

Considera-
tio sup. Conf.
Stif. sue.
P P. Pauli
V.

hardly be spared at any time without envy of the rest, and grumbling at the inequality of publick burthens, so the exigence may be such that They cannot be spared at all. For it may require the utmost of what the Common-wealth can do, and all be little enough. However That what They have may be necessary to the end of the Common-wealth, evidently subjects what They have to the power of the Common-wealth. And this a better Master than *Bellarmin*, *St. Ambrose*, has long since taught us in few, but very significant words: *If Thou wilt not be subject (obnoxius) to Caesar, have no things of the World; but if thou hast Riches, Thou art subject to Caesar.* //

These Considerations are but a few of many which the subject affords. Who would dissect the Notion of Common-wealth into all the parts which necessarily, and indispensably concur to the whole frame, would never have done. There is enough said for a Letter, and what is said, I think is very clear.

'Tis plain the World, which was made for the use of man, cannot be used to any tolerable convenience of life, without those Societies, which are called Common-wealths. 'Tis plain, a Common-wealth cannot be without a Head and Members, nor they without power to command, and obligation to obey, for the end of the Common-wealth. 'Tis plain, the Clergy are Members, at least in a Christian Common-wealth, and though they were not, would be near, what the less subject to the Power under which they live, barely by living under it. For which, though I contented my self, with alledging the custom of Nations, yet who will, may find it in Nature too. As a stranger cannot go into a Foreign Country with safety, unless the Laws there secure him from injury, so neither can that Country receive him with safety, unless the same Laws may hinder him from doing any. Again, those Laws are Rules appointed for the common good, and if the Stranger do not regulate his Actions, and Traffick, and whatever commerce he has with the Natives, by those Rules, the common good is prejudic'd, and the Power to whose care it belongs, is to procure reparation from the Stranger. So that who Travels, does upon the matter leave, or rather suspend his Membership with the community to which Birth subjects him, and

for the time of his stay unites himself to that in which he is, whereof he becomes a kind of Member, with that difference betwixt him and proper Members, which his case requires, and the Laws whether of Nations, or particular Countrys have establish'd. 'Tis farther plain, that Security, and Quiet, are some of the many goods for which men live united in Society. 'Tis plain, they cannot be attained, without power to hinder disquiet, and wrong; and that Power is plainly no Power, if it cannot act where-ever 'tis needful it should for those ends. Wherefore whoever brings disturbance, and injury into the Common-wealth, must of necessity come under the Power which is to keep them out. I might have dilated farther; but I thought it superfluous, conceiving he must be very partial, or rather very blind, who needs more light to discover *Bellarmin's* Exemptions, not only groundless and unproved, but unprovable, and manifestly inconsistent with the great and most natural good of man, regulated Society. Wherefore 'tis as impossible they should be commanded by God, or Nature, as that either can command things harmful to man, or incompatible one with another. Neither can he, who will obstinately persist to maintain they are, avoid being driven at last to say, That Bad proceeds from the Author of Good.

It may seem strange that Learned and Good men should be for things so false, and so pernicious. But whither will not mistaken Zeal transport us? It shew'd them, I suppose, but one side of the Meddal, and made them so hot upon the advantage of the Church, and Church-men, that they minded not the harm they did the Common wealth. Which is the less to be wondred at, because it hindred them from seeing that They hurt even those they think to pleasure. For I am much mistaken if these Exemptions be not more prejudicial to the Clergy themselves, then any body else. And this not only for the dependence the Church has on the Common-wealth, without which it cannot well be, but on nearer and more obvious considerations. Let a King say to a Clergyman, as *Bellarmin* would have him, *I have no power over you*, He says at the same time, *I am no Head in respect of you, nor you a Member in respect of me, or of that Body whereof I am Head*. Thus much even *Bellarmin* himself says; for 'tis

'tis his distinction of material and formal Members, in other words; though I know he elsewhere speaks otherwise. Now This, if I understand *English*, is to say, *If any body wrong you, you must not come to me for redress; for I have nothing to do with you. Or if good nature make me interpose, 'tis purely out of Charity; not Justice and the obligation a Head has to the Members.*

Pray how far is this from Out-lawry? An Out-law is but one put out of the King's protection: and he who cannot claim his protection of right, seems not much, if at all, better than he who is formally put out of it. For a King may protect an Out-law if he please; and unless he please, at this rate he need not protect a Clergy-man. However barely to change the privilege a subject has to say to his Prince, *I beseech you do me Justice*, into *I beseech you do me a kindness*, is what the Clergy are strange men if they take for a Privilege, and they are stranger friends to them who will not be quiet without it.

Again, will not the case be altered, if those among whom They live, cease to look upon them as fellow Members, and whose good, for the community of Society, is their own? The experience of strangers in all Nations, instructs us sufficiently how coldly people interest themselves in their wants, or afflictions, or whatever concerns. And what more than strangers are They, who by ceasing to be under the Princes power, cease to be parts of the Common-wealth? save materially, as *Bellarmin* phrases it, and so are strangers. Till the World be made up of courtesie, and good Nature, and every body be sure to be their friend, whether he be obliged or no, the Clergy in my opinion should for their own sakes, cease even to wish for such Exemptions. As men are now, 'twill be ill for them to have nothing but good Nature, and Courtesie to trust to.

Besides, as the Clergy are of the same nature with other men, they need the same conveniences and supports of life; nor did those, who invented these Exemptions, mean, I suppose, to diminish those conveniences and those supports. Other men seek and find such things in Society: Can the Clergy hope for them otherwise? Can they get what they want, or keep what they get, or recover what they lose, but by means of

the Common-wealth? It is plain, their case is the same with other men in this point. Whatever They enjoy, They hold by Common-wealth Tenure, and cannot possibly hold otherwise. Now I ask not how they can pretend from the Common-wealth, if they be not of the Common-wealth, nor any of the many obvious questions which the matter suggests, and whereof some are partly hinted before. I mind only the Privilege, and would know what Privilege, Exemption from Taxes is, save a Privilege of doing ones self a mischief. A man has a Penny: if he part with one Farthing, he saves three; if he do not, he loses all four. Is it a Privilege to this man, to keep his Farthing, when it is plainly to keep nothing? So it is with the Common-wealth, to which if we contribute nothing, we can keep nothing. It preserves us all we have, and our contributions preserve it. It is the great Ship, which carries us safe through a Sea of miseries, which would otherwise swallow us up. Who desires to be exempted from pumping, and labouring in it, when it is needful, what privilege does he desire, but the privilege of drowning? It is plain, that the good of the whole is every private mans good, and more than any private good can be; for by it he has all other goods. It is plain, that Taxes are necessary to this good. Wherefore it is also plain, that a Privilege of not concurring to Taxes, is but a Privilege of not concurring to a mans own good, and his greatest good; a Privilege of letting the Common-wealth perish, and perishing with it for company. Clergy-men must of necessity stand and fall with it, as well as others, even though they were but material parts of it, as *Bel-larmin* fancies. When the Ship Sinks, the Passenger is lost as well as the Marriner.

I cannot imagine how This should be thought a Privilege unless by that error, which has ruined many a Common-wealth, of thinking all lost which is given to the Publick. Did people reflect, that what is given in that manner, is instead of being lost, put out to Interest for them, and to a greater advantage than they can possibly make themselves, They would change their thoughts and language. The true privilege lies on the other side, that by means of Society, what particular men have shall be employed more for their good; and in a better manner, than themselves can employ it; and that, when they

they have not wit enough to prefer a greater good before a less; there are who will take what they are ready to give, and do them good whether they will or no. Next to the Priviledge of Nature, ability to pursue our own good our selves, is the Priviledge of Fortune, to fall into hands which will do it for us. In short, since Man is a Creature made and obliged to seek his own good, and the great good of man is Society, and the good of that Society, the great good of every particular in it, and Taxes are for the good of that Society, to desire to be exempted from Taxes and think it a Priviledge, is to desire to be exempted from acting according to our Nature, and think that a Priviledge which is a misery. For a man who acts not like a man, is a very wretched, and a very contemptible thing.

I desire not to be mistaken, as if I thought a Commonwealth must needs be ruin'd, as often as a private man fails in his *Quota*, or that some, and as many as the Publick pleases, may not be exempted from Taxes. On the contrary, I conceive it not only safe, but even fit to exempt those who have no more than can be spared from the necessities of the Commonwealth without prejudice, or employ what they have to as great, perhaps a greater advantage than Taxes. For the Commonwealth both needs it not for the end of Taxes, and enjoys the benefit of it in another, and it may be better way. And such at least should be the case of the Clergy, of which I intend to say something before I have done. I meant only to say, that not to concur to Taxes is in its nature ruinous to the Publick, and therefore no Priviledge, but a harm to the Refusers, who if the Commonwealth perish, must needs perish with it. And that it's in its nature ruinous is evident. For let every man refuse, the Commonwealth cannot stand. That this effect does not follow, when private men are either exempted, or exempt themselves by fraud, happens not for want of harm in the thing, but because a single man has no sensible proportion to the whole, and so the good or harm he does is imperceptible. Now if there were but one, or a few Clergymen in a Nation, or but one or a few Fields in their possession, as Little in moral things passes for nothing, They would not need to pretend Natural or Divine Law for Exemptions. Every body would be more forward to give to, than take from them.

them. But where They have a considerable part of the Revenue of the Common-wealth in their hands, as in some places of the *Venetian Territory* *P. Paulo* says, they have a fourth, in some a third part, the Common-wealth can hardly be supported without their assistance. For besides that the rest would always grumble at the inequality of publick burthens, They would not often bear them with any tolerable convenience, where so much more than their share is laid on their shoulders.

I forbear to weave the Exemption from Justice into the same discourse, because every body I suppose will do it of himself. For every body must see that Justice is as great, and as indispensable a good as Taxes, as necessary to the whole, and to Particulars; and therefore that the Priviledge of being exempted from it, is but a priviledge of doing the Common-wealth as much harm, as depends on the Exemptee, and helping to ruine That with which he must needs be ruined too.

Upon the whole I conceive I may with confidence conclude that these Exemptions, as being many ways harmful cannot proceed from God or Nature, and therefore what the Clergy have of this kind, They have from human Power, seeing, and by their wisdom providing, that what harm there is in their Nature, be over-ballanc'd by a greater good. And in this persuasion I conceive too I shall be well abetted. Peradventure where things are clear by Reason, more light is as needless, as Torches to see at Noon. But the palate of the Age is queasie. Men refuse good meat sometimes, because they fancy not the dishes, and will not harken to Truth but from a mouth they like. To gratifie their humours, it will be necessary to take a little more pains, and produce Vouchers of greater credit.

As for grave Authors of his own Form, *Bellarmin* has exempted me from the trouble of looking after them. For he brings them to the Bar himself, and opens their Evidence, and strives to answer it.

I thought once to have Reply'd to his Answers. But besides that my Pitcher, contrary to the case in *Horace*, is already become a Jarr, and 'twould be monstrous to work it into a Tun, I considered it is not our business at present. We are not now upon the *What's said*, but the *Who said it*. To examine

mine who has most reason for what he says, is to turn back to the merits of the Cause; which if any one will do, I am well content to leave him to himself. For he must have either very bad eyes, or much turn'd away, who will not easily see through all that is said. In the mean time it is enough for my purpose that 'tis acknowledged, and by Bellarmin himself, that what he says is contradicted by Catholics, men of note as well as himself, and whose No has as much authority as his I

But I conceive it fitting to produce some of a higher Form, and whose credit is unquestionable. To begin with one, against whom none can speak, or be heard without impiety, I vouch in the first place St. Paul, Rom. 13. *Let every Soul be subject to the higher Powers.* And here I might end as well as begin: For this is in truth alone decisive. He must have no Soul who can pretend this command comprehends him not. Yet let us hear his Interpreters. Theodoret upon this place has these words, *Sive est Sacerdos, &c. whether one be a Priest, or Prelate, or have profess'd a Monastical life, let him obey those (iis cedat) to whom Magistracy is committed.* Theophylact, upon the same place, has almost the same words; *Universos erudit, &c. He instructs All, whether a Priest, or Monk, or Apostle, that they be subject to Princes.* St. Chrysostom, Hom. 23. upon the Epistle to the Romans, *Sed ex Paulus, &c. But Paul makes use of such reasons as command obedience to the Powers by way of debt, shewing those things are commanded All, as well Priests as Monks, not Seculars only. And thus he declares in the very beginning, when he says, Let every Soul be subject to the higher Powers: Though you be an Apostle, though an Evangelist, though a Prophet; in fine, whatsoever you be. For this subjection is not against Piety.*

Let us next hear Popes themselves. Gelasius writing to the Emperour Anastasius, tells him, that *The Prelates of the Church owe him all obedience in Temporals:* And again, Ep. 10. *Antistites Religionis, Bishops also themselves are to obey thy Laws,* and this because, *forasmuch as concerns the Order of Publick Discipline, that is, the Government of the Common-wealth, We know the power is by supernal disposition, given to Thee.* Anastasius to the same Emperour acknowledges, that *Bishops are subject to the Laws of the Prince in what concerns publick*

Wick Discipline: But *Reince* to Bishops in disposing the Myste-
 ries and Sacraments be *Belagued* the first, Ep^o 16 to *Childebert*
 King of France. *With* how much study and labour must we
 endeavour, for taking away the scandal of *Insurrection*, to offer
 the duty of confession with *Kingly*, so *whom* the Holy Scriptures
 command us also to be subject. St. *Gregory the Great* speaks
 with a submission which offends *Baronius*, and makes him strain
 his wits to find a scurvy way to colour the business. But no *Var-*
nish will ly. That he was subject to the Emperours command:
 That he did what he ought in obeying the Emperours on one side,
 and speaking for God on the other: That Power from Heaven
 is given up the *Pier* of his Lords, as he calls Emperours, *com-*
mand men, over Priests, as well as Souldiers, &c. have a blunt ill
 natured clearness, which no Art can practice upon. *So* *quod*
non can not but take notice by the way how *Belarius* in *divis*
 to weather those Rocks. He objects against himself the afore-
 said phice of St. *Paul* with the other to the same purpose
 of St. *Peter* and what St. *Chrysostome* says of the matter:
 That *adversus* that those places are general, and mean no
 more than that every one be subject to his own Superior.
 But the subjection of the Clergy to Princes cannot be proved by
 them, till it be proved that Princes are lawful Superiours and
 Judges of the Clergy, which cannot be proved, till it be proved
 that Sheep have prebeminence over Pastors, Children over Parents,
 and Temporal over Spirituals. And yet we do not contradict
 St. *Chrysostome* neither. For though we say the Pope alone is
 the proper Judge of the Clergy and Monks, yet we confess
 the King is King of them as well as the Laity. For Princes
 fight for them, and They must honour and pray for him, and
 obey him too, directly, not co-actively, and with his for-
 m and restrictions. *Now* *adversus* *quod* *non* *est* *ad* *id* *quod* *est*
 That Prejudice should be thus powerful! Is it possible *Bel-*
larmine should in earnest perswade himself, the Apostles meant
 only in general, that every one should obey whom he ought
 to obey, the Laity their Secular, the Clergy their Ecclesiastical
 Superiours? Are not the Superiours, or higher Powers, whom
 All are commanded to obey, expressly named by St. *Peter*,
 Kings, and Dukes, or Governours, sent to punish evil doers;
 and by St. *Paul*, Magistrates who bear the Sword? Can he
 think this Command is comply'd with by obedience to Ec-
 clesiastical

ecclesiastical Superiours? Are They Kings? Do they bear the Sword? Are They the Ministers of God to wrath, and vengeance? What better proof would he have, than that Kings are lawful Superiours, even of the Clergy, than *St. Paul* gives, viz. that their powers are ordained by God, whom to resist is to acquire Damnation?

In *St. Peter* we find the reason of his Doctrine express, when he admonishes Christians so to converse among the Gentiles, that They who speak ill of them, may be moved by their good Works to glorify God, and the ignorance of the foolish be silenc'd. By the Calumny which the Apostle means, all Interpreters understand a suspicion crept in among the Gentiles of disobedience to Temporal powers, and contempt of their Laws. For such a seditious Doctrine there was among the Jews, begun by *Judas the Galilean*, and tenaciously embrac'd by the Pharisees. It was too well known by the disorders it caus'd, and being mistaken for a point of the Jews Religion, Christians were aspers'd with it as deriding their Religion from them. Both the Apostles took care to clear Christianity from the aspersion, and therefore instructed the Faithful to obey Secular powers, not by constraint or force, *Propter Timorem*, as they phrase it, but for conscience, because such was the Will of God, who had given them the power they had.

This was the matter of Fact. Consider now how *Bellarmin* handles it. There is indeed, saith he, express mention made of Kings, because at that time it was very necessary, least they should have hindred the Preaching of the Gospel; but yet the Apostles meant no more, than that every one should be subject to his own lawful Superiour.

Is not this to say, that the Apostles were not men of that holy simplicity, which is believed? For 'tis plainly to go about to over-reach Princes with fair words: to seek, by making them believe They should have obedience from All, to cajole them into the Church, there to be taught a new lesson, and find there was no such matter. Is it not to say, They did not dispence the Gospel with that Fidelity which they profess? For they included every one within the command of obedience, and yet meant a good part should not be included. They taught that Kings and Magistrates were Higher powers in re-

spect of all, and that it is the Will of God, that all be sub-
 ject to them; and know for this that it is not the Will of God,
 and that they are not higher Powers in respect of the Clergy,
 hath made it to make them speak plain words (here) and in
 this Comment pass, their discourse will be upon Points have
 no reason to think any Christian disobedience to Civil Authori-
 ty. For we tell you some manifestly in the rest Eccle-
 siastical. *Dei iussu regum Christianorum* id est *Dei iussu* 2087
 11. *Dei iussu* for *St. Chrysostom*, he contradicts not things he says,
 The said says, That All the Clergy as well as the rest and
 the highest degrees of them are subject to those Higher Powers
 of which *St. Basil* speaks, & *Bellarmin* says, Princes can hold
 themselves with their Persons, nor Goods. Is not this so say,
 They are not subject and is not subject, and not subject, about
 tradition. How can he avoid contradicting *St. Chrysostom*,
 and the rest, who speak as he does? Why, though he make
 the Pope alone the proper Judge, yet he allow the Prince to
 judge of the Clergy, &c. What is this but a new contradic-
 tion? For how can a King be a King, and not a proper
 Judge? To determine differences is one, and an essential part
 of a Kings Office. 'Tis true, between a Judge by Commis-
 sion, and a King, there is a difference. And yet even this
 one represents the King. But to be a proper Judge without
 Commission, by an inherent right of his own, is inseparable
 from a King. The truth is, 'tis all contradiction from the re-
 left. Secular Princes are not lawful Superiours, and yet Kings
 of the Clergy, is contradiction: They have Kingly, that is
 Supreme Power, and yet the Ecclesiastical is to be obeyed in
 case of contrary commands, is contradiction. They are Kings
 in respect of those who are not Subjects, nor formally parts of
 the Common-wealth, is contradiction, &c. And yet this hap-
 pens not by *Bellarmin's* fault. He has but one; fixing on the
 wrong side: which whoever does, let him be never so learned,
 can find more void contradiction, than He can falling, let him
 be never so dextrous, under whom the ground founders. To
 But to return to our Road, People may speculate themselves
 out of Common sense, if they will, and do more often than
 every body thinks. The truth is, whoever takes a wrong
 Principle, and will pursue in that, come thither or no. Yet
 though he may so disguise the matter with learned subtilties,
 that

that he perceiveth not where he is himself, Nature will be too strong for Antidote, and shew it self through all disguises. Arguments have been made against the possibility of Motion, and whiteness of Snow; but the World could never be persuaded they should not go about their business, or that Snow look'd like Jet. We have found the point in question rooted in Nature, and cultivated by the great Labourers in the field of Grace, the Apostles. Either way it must needs grow, and appear in the hearts whether of men or Faithful. And so it evidently does. Let a man go to a Bishop or Bishop in any Country of Christendom, and ask him seriously, *Priged he lay to the Common-wealth in which you live, and are you subject of the Prince?* He would not hardly be well in his wits. Such they own, such they call, and waite themselves, for such the Prince, and People, and every body takes them; and it is more known that there are Clergy-men, where, than that where, even they are. They are Subjects in the Prince of this place, both in the esteem of all besides, and their own constant profession. You have said, *and it is no work to it.* Take for a curiosity, (For the clearness of the thing doth need no proof,) the Oath which the Bishops in France make to their King. *I swear and promise to your Majesty, Sir, that in all things I will be to you a Faithful Subject, and I will use all my power, I will propose, I will procure, I will defend your Service and Estate: that I will never be present at any Council or Assembly, held to the prejudice of them, and that if any thing come to my knowledge, I will presently give advice to your Majesty.* So help me God, and his Holy Gospel. *It is so palpable a Truth, that Bellarmine, as contradicted as it is to his Doctrine, cannot but acknowledge it.* For this reason he is forc'd to confess, that Kings are Kings in respect of the Clergy as well as Laity; that the Clergy, besides their Spiritual capacity, are also parts of the Common-wealth; and in that quality oblig'd to obedience, &c. For the light of Nature, however it may be obscured in particulars, cannot be put out generally. And now for our parts, you know, think as much of what is written in our hearts by the Apostles. But to let that pass. This is in truth the whole business. To your Question, whether the Clergy are Subjects or no, all Christendom answers they are. Now 'tis evident that Subjects

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jects remaining Subjects can have nothing inconsistent with sub-
jection: And 'tis as evident, that the Exceptions in question,
in the latitude in which *Bellarmin* proposes, and y^eund^{er}stand^{ing}
stand them, are inconsistent with subjection. And 'tis as evi-
dent, They belong not to the Clergy by Divine, nor any
Right. Neither can they, as they have, no Exceptions
from subjection; but in the manner of subjection as Pri-
vileges put a difference between Subjects, requiring either dif-
ferent duties, or the same duties in a different manner from
some, and others. And since the difference betwixt them, and
the Lay, as to subjection, is not from their state, and where
the Law upon no difference, all are alike Subject, there can be
no Title, nor Privilege to the difference which is, but from the
Laws, and the pleasure of the Power which made them.

What Reason tells us must be, unquestionable Records as-
sure us actually was. For the Laws are still extant among
the rest, which make up the Body of the Civil Law, by
which the Clergy obtained now once, now another Privilege, and
till the whole number was completed by many Emperors;
and in a long time I had once resolv'd to set them down;
but my Letter being long, and that Book common, I thought
it not convenient to make it, with copying I was not
the curiosity may as well see in the Original, besides that
our Country not being subject to the Imperial Laws, what pri-
vileges of the Clergy here are to be regulated, not by theirs
but our own. Yet 'tis not amiss to see what *Bellarmin* says
them. He objects them against himself, as a proof that the
Clergy heretofore were of Right subject to Emperors; and
answers that the Emperors sometimes modelle with what they
have nothing to do; and therefore those Laws must needs be said
to proceed *De Re, not De Jure*, and to have been tolerated
sometimes, but never approved by Popes.

This to my ear sounds very strangely. What has the Popes
approbation to do with the Laws of Emperors? Cannot
They make Laws without asking him? No, cannot They
do so much as to bind the Clergy, but by authority de-
rived from him? Again, if this approbation were of any con-
sideration, how could it appear more plainly than in that which
Bellarmin calls his Toleration, in taking advantage of them,
and taking care they should be every where kept, and the
Clergy

Clergy enjoy what They had in them: Of which there are
 instances enough to be produced, if there were need. For I
 cannot think that *Bellarmin* is of opinion to carnal, that the
 Pope did not like that, and was not desirous to have them
 100. On the contrary, I am apt to believe that had the
 World remained in the same state, in which it was when these
 Laws were made, sub. to the Roman Empire, He had them
 so well, that he would never have took a for more, nor
 heard any news of Divine Right. But the state of things
 being, and Municipal Laws prevailing over those Laws, in a
 great part of Christendom, it became necessary as *Bellarmin*
 those privileges, to find out a Title to them, which might be
 what those Laws no longer could, carry them through every
 where. Divine Right peradventure had still with it never been
 thought of. *Reb. Reason tells us must be*

why may I not
 show things

But in this case, to say the Laws proceeded from the
 or were unjustly, that supposition is a foundation, that had need
 be very sure of what he says, who is a *Bellarmin* and a
Bellarmin, who has set upon the point, and was undertaken
 the proof of Divine Right, could find nothing beyond pro-
 bable ground to himself. But because *Probabilis* makes a man
 sure of nothing, will give him was, something for a bare
 Emption of the thing, to Tax them as Justice. For
 if they have any, it is more than he knows of by his own
 confession.

But let us consider a little, and ask whether the Clergy of
 those times, when whose Laws were made, did know that
 without, and independent of them, there was a Law to the
 same privileges, as other Laws, those of God and Nature.
 If they did not, they were manifestly ignorant in opinion of
 Gods Law. If it be as *Bellarmin* says Gods Law, is beyond
 can imagine this of those Lights, the greater, since they had
 files say, that ever shined in the Church. And now comes
Bellarmin to know that of which they were ignorant. If they
 did, they were manifestly not guided in their duty. For they
 ought to have instructed the people about this point, of Gods
 Law, as well as the civil, which they were manifestly
 pensers of the Word, and instructed part of what was
 trusted to them, as guides.

That

That They did not teach the Emperours any such Doctrine, is plain, because the Emperours learn'd it not, who yet learn'd all Christianity from them, and must have learn'd this if it had been any part of the Lesson. I hope it will not be put off upon their restlessness, to admit a point derogatory to their Authority. Believers, that this conceit contradicts Christianity, with holding Doctrines derogatory to the Authority of Priests, and justifies that calumny of the Pagans, which the Apostles were solicitous to take away, 'tis an aspersion unflatteringly injurious to the piety of those Emperours, and manifestly impossible besides.

For those Exemptions were not granted all at one time, or by one Emperour. Between the first grant by *Constantine*, and the last in the Law, there intervened several hundreds of years. During this time these Priviledges (for so they are expressly term'd) came forth, now one, now another, as the necessity of the Church, the solicitation of the Clergy, and reason of the thing prevail'd. Can it be imagin'd, among so many Emperours, all Christian, there was no one of vertue enough to admit a Right establish'd by God, and who favour'd the Clergy enough, not to keep from them what was their due? Were there but one such in all the number, as it cannot be deny'd but that there were many, and He made known the Law of God, was as *Bellarmin* says, of which it was both the duty and duty and interest of the Clergy to make him know, the business could not possibly pass as it did. For he would certainly have acknowledged this Right of theirs, and instead of so many grants one after another, once for all confirm'd that right by his Authority, and this with reference to the Law of God, and as their right, not by way of Priviledge, as the subject of their Laws runs. 'Tis therefore as plain as can be, that the Clergy, who were as *Bellarmin* says *de Facto* subject, thought they ought to be subject; 'Tis plain the Emperours thought so too, and were not otherwise instructed by the Masters of Christianity in those times. Wherefore 'tis plain, the face of the Christian World then, was quite different from what is *Bellarmin*'s now, and I think there needs something more than unconvincing Arguments to persuade a man, that the whole Christian World was in an Error.

As for the quarrel he has to the Laws for disposing of things plainly Ecclesiastical and Spiritually, I know not what reply to it, unless he would explain himself a little more. Princes I think may make Laws in matters purely Ecclesiastical and Spiritual, without asking *Bellarmine's* leave, or giving him cause of offence. When they enact *Babes* to be born the Church, Tithes to be paid, when the Christian Law they teach to be obeyed, and a hundred things more, He does not care believe They do the Clergy wrong, or exceed their own bounds. In general, let a thing be never so Spiritual, and yet so much commanded by God, if you will have the Transgression aw'd by the fear of Temporal punishment, the concurrence of Temporal Authority is necessary to execute the Temporal Sword. Otherwise who is wicked enough to light the Spiritual, and stand out an Excommunication, may break all the Laws of God at pleasure. Wherefore this objection to the subjects of a Temporal Law, *Et hoc in hoc dicitur* with a matter plainly Spiritual, is plainly no in Exception, which *Bellarmine* says by it, we shall know when he tells us what his meaning is. And yet, though it were true, that those Princes had sometimes pass'd their bounds, it is nothing to purpose unless it be proved, they did so in this particular. To take full for granted, that Princes did against *Mowbray*, and *Richard* sure we should therefore believe they did against us, is to impose upon us, a little too grosse.

After all, as learned a Jew as he makes of confuting some body, we think all parties are agreed, *The Church were better for itself, and this appears by the Law*, and the objection. By the way, this can mean nothing but that, as to the matters indulged them by Privileges, They were subjects in the same manner as the Laity, till those privileges put a difference between them. Otherwise that notwithstanding their privileges They always were, and still are, truly subjects, is the sense of all the World. To this, what says *Bellarmine*? *That those Laws proceeded de Facto, not de Jure*. This is to say, that as *Paul* and they were subjects as well as *John* *Wang* heretofore, and that this appears by these Laws which proceeded *de Facto*, to favour them in some things. And this is the very thing which the objection says. That they did not proceed *de Jure*, he perhaps may be allowed to say, because he would otherwise have nothing

nothing to say; but reason will not allow any man to believe him, unless he could prove it, which when he went about to do, we see how ill he succeeded.

In the mean time I see these priviledges were granted at several, and long distant times. I see that the Clergy when they had the former, had not the later, and before They had the first, had none at all. Wherefore I must needs think that as They were *de Facto* subject before the Laws, so they would be *de Facto* still but for the Laws. This way They have a clear undoubted right to their priviledges, as much and as strong as any body has to any worldly thing. No other Right was ever thought of in those Ages; and yet in those Ages lived all the Doctors of the Church both *Greek* and *Latin*; men who had at least as much insight into the Laws of God and Nature as *Bellarmin*, and as much Zeal for the good and honour of the Church. He does not make out so much as plausibly the Right which he pretends from those Laws. I conceive therefore I may conclude upon the whole, the Exemptions, or priviledges which the Clergy have, are all from Human, not Divine Law, which though it alwaies guided the Church, and was peradventure better understood, and more reverenc'd in former times, was never pretended till lately: That They neither have nor can have any Exemptions, which free them absolutely from subjection, that being a thing which neither a Prince can give, nor Nature bear: And that whatever *Bellarmin* says, this is acknowledg'd both by the Clergy themselves, and all the World besides, by the universal consent of all people and places that notwithstanding all their Exemptions, They are still truly Subjects, and by being so obliged to all that subjection obliges, with that difference betwixt them and others in the performance of their subjection, which their priviledges import. Possibly out of this universality may be excepted some of those who live as *Bellarmin* did, in the Popes Territories, and so have but one Prince both in Spirituals and Temporals. These are too apt to think it is, or ought to be, with the rest of the World as it is with them; And who knows whether that conceit be not the original source of the whole stream? But elsewhere I think the General Rule has no exception.

And so I had done, but that I remember we live in times, in which notice is publickly taken of the contempt of the Clergy,

Clergy, and Reasons given for it. They indeed miss the mark, nor do I think it fit to give the true ones. But I would not have the bad humour of the Age fed by any thing of mine. As *Bellarmin* has gone too far on the one side, ill will may go much farther on the other, and possibly take occasion from what I have said against him to do so. I conceive it therefore fit, before I close my Letter, to resume some considerations, which I forbore to mention when they occurred, for fear of straying from the matter in hand.

Bellarmin tells us, the Clergy and their Goods are Sacred things, and the peculiar Lot of God. This is highly understood, is a great, and even to the Laity, beneficial Truth. Yet 'tis to be suspected He did not penetrate it enough, because he concludes wrong, that they are therefore both quite out of the reach of Secular power. One might take a fancy to argue them out of the reach of the Ecclesiastical too. For what has any man to do with what properly belongs to God? If you say the Ecclesiastical power is from God; so likewise is the Secular. And so people might with fruitless Conceits and Repartees, go on in endless wrangling.

Let us therefore reflect a little on what every body knows, that God neither stands in need of any created good, nor is capable of receiving either good or harm from Creatures. For that essential and overflowing fulness of his own perfection can neither get nor lose. That overflow of goodness has created man for the good of man, not God, and all material nature besides, not for its self, or for God, but purely for the use of man. Likewise what he commands, or requires of man, is only for the benefit of man, who by obeying or disobeying does himself good or harm, but none to God. Those Phrases therefore of serving God, being his, and the like, are expressions introduc'd by his mercy in condescendence to our weakness, to raise us up by the aw of his Interposing, more steadily to perform those actions, which in truth are profitable only to our selves. We have the whole benefit of the service we are said to do him, and in reality serve our selves, when we are said to serve him. So likewise the things which are called his, are neither taken from us, nor spent in any use of his, to whom nothing can be useful, but ordered by him to be employed in a way most beneficial to us, in which they would either not at all,

Or not so well and readily be employ'd, if we were not assisted by an apprehension of a particular concern, or propriety of his in them. Applying this to the Clergy, when They, or their Goods are called the Lot of God, given or consecrated to him, peculiarly his, and what else is said of this kind, 'tis not that He is subject to the *Meum* and *Tuum* found in the World; nor can his property have the same Notion, which ours has in respect of our Goods or Servants, who are wrong'd when they are taken away, or disposed of, without our consent. But the meaning is, that They are establish'd in a way of life in which by actions proper to it, they are to employ Themselves and their Goods, to the greatest advantage of themselves and their Neighbour. From which that they be not diverted by humour, or interest, or violence, to ends less beneficial to mankind, He is intitled to them, that who neither cares nor fears to wrong another man, may be checkt by the fear of wronging God; against whose Anger there is no Shelter.

And very requisite it is, it should be so. A Christian Common-wealth can no more be without Clergy, than Christianity. Because they are men, They cannot be without such things as the nature of men requires; Meat to feed, and Cloaths to cover them; and this not only what is barely sufficient to preserve them from Hunger and Cold; but, as the temper of the World is, where Poverty is always accompanied with abjection and scorn, in a proportion which may keep them in reputation with those among whom They live, and with whom in a condition of Contempt They would want credit to do them the good they ought. Besides, there must be Churches for people to Assemble in; The service there, must not be slovenly, and sordid, and apt to tempt those who come, to irreverence, or abstain from coming again for scorn. You know blame our Church for excessive Pomp in the Sacred Service; I for my part, think no Pomp can be too much. Had you reflected as much as I have done on the nature of man, and how strong the Animal part is yet in the best of us, peradventure you would be of my mind. But letting that pass, there goes expence to all this, and who will be most thrifty in the Service of God, will find it cannot be performed in any tolerable way for a little.

Christianity would quickly be in a lamentable case, if the Clergy had not wherewith to maintain themselves, as 'tis fit They should be maintained; or their maintenance depended on the Capricio's of often froward, and sometimes malicious men. They must of necessity either diminish into a number too small, or languish in a contempt unable to benefit the World. If there were no money to build Churches, no provision to keep them in repair, no allotments for the expences of the Service in them; within a while there would be either no Churches, or no Service in them. If They were debarr'd the exercise of their Functions, or transplanted into other Callings, or so taken up with other employments, that they could not attend their own, whether by the humorous pleasure of other men, or their own irregular passions, mankind must needs lose the benefit it receives by them, and that is no less than the hopes, because the means, of a happy Eternity.

That both the men therefore, and the Goods appropriated to these ends, be look'd upon as Sacred, and appropriated in a peculiar manner to God, and wicked or inconsiderate men be aw'd by the fear of Sacrilege, from prejudicing Christianity, by meddling with either, is a great mercy of God, and great benefit to Man. But it follows not therefore, They may on no occasion be touch'd. A Clergy-man may become wicked, and hardned, and obdurate in wickedness. The good of the Common-wealth may require, that the incorrigible offender be cut off, whether for Example, or to avoid perpetual Injuries and disturbances to particulars, or sometimes hazard to the whole. Can any man think, if this be a requisite and necessary good, that God would hinder it, and that He who neither has, nor can have other end in all he commands, then good to man, should command what is harmful to man? The injury to him, if any could be done him, would be to harbour so preposterous a conceit of him, and his commands, as if he would be displeased when we did our selves good. But if the Temporal Sword must be used, 'tis evident it must be used by the Temporal Power, for the Spiritual has it not to use. And because it must not strike blindly, the Temporal Power must also take cognizance of the matter, and see why, and when, and how far it is fit to strike.

For the rest, here is great reason They should be exempted from Magistracy, and Souldiery, from Trades, Offices, and whatever Services of the Common-wealth. For their own Function plainly requires a whole man, whether you look upon the qualities necessary for it, neither to be gained, nor preserved without long and constant pains; or the perpetual, and those necessary occasions of exercising it. Between both, They have employment for every minute of time they have, and for more if they had it, and must of necessity neglect their own duty, if any considerable part of their time be taken with any other. Again, as a man of no esteem shall be but ill heard of, whatsoever he speaks, there will be small efficacy in their Exhortations to vertue and good life, if They be not in good reputation. Wherefore, if at any time They yield to the temptations of human frailty, it is but fit their faults be kept as much as may be from the eyes of the Vulgar, and rectified among themselves. And if they have Judges of their own quality, to end their differences, and correct their misdemeanours, and preserve their reputation unsoyl'd with the Laity, the benefit is not less, perhaps more to the Laity than to Them. In fine, 'tis for the advantage of the Common-wealth, that They have whatever is useful to perform in the best manner a Function, which is more advantageous to the Common-wealth, than any other is or can be. And if the Common-wealth grant Them not all such Exemptions or Priviledges, or however you will call them, it plainly wrongs it self. But yet it is the Common-wealth which grants them. For as for Judges, unless they Act in the nature of Arbitrators, by voluntary consent and submission of the partys, They cannot proceed to force, but by vertue of the Temporal Sword; and however Ecclesiastical the Persons be, the Judges are pure Secular Judges, when they proceed in that manner. Again, since no person nor his Service can be taken from the Common-wealth without its good will, and consent, the other Exemptions are also from the Common-wealth; though peradventure in things apparently inconsistent with the Function, to allow the Function may be to grant the Exemption without more ado. That of particular Judges is more subject to the circumstances of Time and Place, and therefore more depends on the pleasure of Common-wealths,

weakhs, which also proceed differently, as every one finds most convenient for it self.

As for their Goods, to note this briefly by the way, The Clergy were at first rather Trustees, or Stewards than Proprietors. Being look'd upon as men free from affections to the things of this World, the piety of rich men gave largely to them, to maintain Themselves, and the Poor, whence their Revenues got the name of the Patrimony of the Poor, besides to keep the Churches in repair, and furnish the expences of the Service in it. The money thus given was put into the Bishops hands, and by his appointment distributed to the severall uses by the Deacons, who gave account of their distribution to the Bishop. Afterwards the passions of men giving occasion to complain of inequality in the distributions, this Arbitrary management was altered by Canons, and the Whole divided into four parts. One for the Poor; another for the Clergy; a third, for Repairs; the fourth for the Bishop and his Family, to exercise Hospitality. In process of time this too was changed. What became of the share of the Poor, and Churches I cannot tell; but the Bishop, and inferiour Clergy disposed absolutely, and independently, without any account, of their own. An opinion being set on foot, which does not relish with every body, even at this day, that they are true Proprietors of their Goods.

However it be, had They no more than is requisite to maintain them in the way in which 'tis fit they should be maintained; or the over-plus were spent in the uses before mentioned, and for which at first 'twas given; there is great reason to look upon their Goods, as the Lot of God, and upon taking them away as Sacrilege. Neither could the Common-wealth require any thing of them, without employing it in uses less beneficial to It, than those in which it is employ'd already; neither could there be any pretence to do it. For a Common-wealth in her greatest exigencies, never takes from any so much as not to leave them wherewith to subsist. And 'twould be contrary to the end of Taxes if they should. For Taxes are to preserve what people have from Enemys. And no Enemy could take away more than All. So that the Common-wealth by so unjust a Tax would become the Enemy. But it never does Tax those who have nothing to spare, and had the Clergy

no

no over-plus, They would be in the condition of poor men, untaxable.

But when They have not only sufficient, but abundance, and excess, it is extravagant to fancy the Common-wealth cannot take what is not needed, to employ it where it is. We see their excess, instead of preserving, sometimes diminishes their reputation, and exposes them to the envy, and murmurs of people, who grumble to see the liberality, perhaps of their own Ancestors, abused it may be to vanity. To intitle God to goods so employ'd, is to intitle him to the abuse of things, and to Vanity. Nor can any thing be more ridiculous, than because what is necessary for his Service, ought be esteemed Sacred, and his, to think that must be so too which is employ'd not in his Service, sometimes against it, and his Laws too. In short, if the Common-wealth need it, and They can spare it, It is injurious to God to fancy he would have any thing employ'd less usefully for man than it might be.

Upon the whole, I conceive They have from God the Prerogative of the Keys: They have Commission to go and teach, and Baptize all Nations: They have assurance of his perpetual assistance in the execution of their Commission, and of a Wo if they execute it not, and whatever else appears in the Sacred Books or Tradition. The Piety of Men superadded the rest, some more necessary, all convenient, and which, as many as they are, I wish were more. And so I take my leave both of Them and You, remaining

Yours, &c.

Your

YOUR Postscript makes me a very strange Complement. For why should you think me the only honest man? Had you address your self to others, as you might to divers, who would have told you the same tale, They, it seems, would have been the honest men, and I for want of luck, in your black Roll. And yet I think it more possible for thousands of my Religion to get through the grace of God, an intire Mastery over the corruption of Nature in all particulars, than that any wisdom of Laws should make all the Subjects of a Nation honest men. In short, we inherit the Doctrines, and we inherit the Innocence of our Ancestors the Primitive Christians, and while you will have it so, must inherit their hard fate too, and bear the burthen of other Folks folly. But I should think, if you would *Gal. 6. 3. let every one bear his own burthen,* and that *Soul only die which* *Ezech. 18. fins,* you would find by experience it were the best Policy as well as Piety. For God's Law is the best way both to prosperity in this World, and happiness in the next. For the rest, I assure you faithfully, I know nothing of the matter you mention. I know that bad effects are not incredible of bad causes, and I know those bad causes have nothing to do, at least, with my Religion. In every thing else, I am as ignorant as those in *China.*

F I N I S.